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A Good Old Habit, or Just an Old One? Preferential
Tax Treatment for Reorganizations
Yariv Brauner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC)1 contains some exceptional
rules applying to corporate structural changes. These rules grant
preferential tax treatment to a significant volume of merger and
acquisition (M&A) transactions.2 Nevertheless, it is hard to establish
a clear and comprehensive rationale for the current rules, which
should be surprising but is not so to any student of the material.
Oddly enough, these rules are some of the most stable foundations
of the federal tax system despite their shaky normative grounds. In
this Article, I propose to repeal these rules and to tax
"reorganization" transactions3 like all other sales or exchanges. I
reject the stated rationale for these rules-that such transactions
trigger insufficient realization and, therefore, that it is both unfair
and impractical to currently tax them. I further demonstrate that the
preferential tax treatment of reorganizations cannot be supported on
efficiency grounds.4
In certain circumstances, the reorganization rules allow some
taxpayers not to recognize (and therefore not to be currently taxed
on) the gain they realize in these transactions. The "price" of such
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. The
author wishes to thank William Allen, Charlotte Crane, James Eustice, Kimberlee Hiatt, Zohar
Goshen, Marcel Kahan, Shmuel Leshem, Paul McDaniel, Daniel Shaviro, John Steines, and
Scott Waldman for their useful comments, assistance, and support-all mistakes arc obviously
mine.
1. Unless otherwise provided, all references are to the IRC and the Treasury
Regulations prescribed under it.
2. See I.RtC. §§ 354, 361,368 (2000).
3. In this Article, I loosely use the term "reorganizations" to describe corporate
structural changes that benefit from preferential tax treatment, following the § 368 definition
of such transactions, but my definition is not in complete accordance with the substantive
content of § 368.
4. Although efficiency has not been explicitly stated as a justification for these rules, it
has been raised indirectly as if it were an incontestable advantage of the reorganization
provisions. See infra Part III.
nonrecognition is usually some sort of carry-over tax basis, which, in
effect, results in tax deferral and a timing preference for these
taxpayers. For example, consider T, an individual inventor and a
100% shareholder of InventCorp, a Delaware corporation that has
developed and secured a patent on an invention. T agrees to merge
InventCorp, under Delaware law, into IBM in exchange for one
million dollars' worth of IBM stock. Pursuant to the reorganization
rules, T will not be taxed upon the transaction. Assuming normal
start-up circumstances, T's realized gain of close to one million
dollars may be deferred until she disposes of the IBM stock received
in the transaction, her basis in which is transferred from her
InventCorp stock forgone in the merger.' Note that if T received
one million dollars in cash in the merger, or if she had developed the
invention in her capacity as an individual, she would be currently
taxed on her entire gain. This (deferral) preference may translate into
indefinite deferral and to partial or complete avoidance of the tax.6
Nevertheless, this preference has been established over the last eighty
years as a cornerstone of the federal income tax system.
In this Article, I focus only on the primary acquisitive
reorganizations: the type A statutory merger, the type B stock-for-
stock acquisition, and the type C assets-for-stock acquisition. The
rules governing corporate structural changes include a wide variety of
other transactions that have many similar features for tax policy
purposes,7  but the analysis of which must be deferred for
methodological and simplification purposes.
The common feature of all reorganization transactions and, as we
will see shortly, the stated justification of the applicable tax rules, is
that in these transactions either the core ownership group or the core
business, or both, remain substantively the same but undergo a
formal change that is justified by business reasons:
5. Her basis amount is probably a negligible amount equal to her investment of money
and property in InventCorp. I ignore this amount in this Article and consider it to be equal to
zero.
6. Complete avoidance was even easier prior to the 1986 repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine. Gen. Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See also
Eric M. Zolt, The General Utilities Doctrine: Examining the Scope of the Repeal, 65 TAXES 819
(1987).
7. These are the rules applying to the organization of corporations (§ 351),
termination of corporations in certain circumstances (§ 332 and § 337), and some other basic
transactions affecting structural changes of corporations, primarily those falling into the
definition of a "reorganization" (§ 368).
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The traditional theory . . . is that gain or loss should not be
recognized on changes of form when the taxpayer's investment
remains in [the] corporate solution or when "a formal
distribution.., represents merely a new form of the previous
participation in an enterprise involving no change of substance in
the rights and relations of interested parties one to another or to
the corporate assets.",
8
The courts and the business community have never questioned
the logic of these rules. The government has attempted, from time
to time, to analyze some of their specific details, but except for a
short episode in the 1930s, it has not made a serious attempt to
conceptually revise, or even review the normative foundation of,
these rules. The legislature has consistently concentrated on shutting
down abuse potentials rather than questioning the basic premises
behind this tax regime. The result is an extremely stable (but
stagnant) regime that is resistant to change despite its inadequacies,
which are exposed mainly by academics. 9 The resulting system,
described by one scholar, consists of "a variety of patterns of taxation
[that] have emerged through largely uncoordinated, ad hoc
legislative and judicial development . . . containing unsupportable
distinctions and inconsistencies, [which are] massively complex." °
This harsh description is not surprising to anyone exposed to this
notoriously "complex and cryptic"" regime, but general industry
satisfaction has evidently been sufficient to ensure the retention of
this major part of the tax law.
Part II follows with an analysis and rejection of the stated
realization-based rationale for the reorganization rules. It
demonstrates that the reasons for adopting the realization
requirement itself-mainly liquidity concerns and valuation
hardship-are either irrelevant or cannot support the argument that
the tax preference to reorganizations is necessary to maintain the
8. BORIS I. BITiKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 12.01[3] (7th ed. 2000) (citing in part Bazley v.
C.I.R., 331 U.S. 737, 740, rebq denied, 332 U.S. 752 (1947)).
9. Jerome R Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REv. 254, 276
(1957); William A. Lovett, Tax Subsidies for Merger: Should Mergers be Made to Meet a Market
Test for Efficiency?, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844 (1970).
10. Glenn E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Mandatory Uniform
Rules, 44 TAX L. REV. 145, 146 (1989).
11. Milton Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations," 38 COLUM. L.
REV. 98, 98 (1938).
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integrity of the realization requirement as a fundamental feature of
the federal income tax.'
2
Part III analyzes the argument that another purpose of the
reorganization provisions could have been the generation of
efficiency benefits. This argument, normally stated in negative terms,
has been that without these rules the tax system would have
restricted socially beneficial transactions."3 In this Part, I first
reconstruct and then challenge this argument, which has not been
methodically established in legal academic literature. Fortunately,
there is a significant body of economic, business, and corporate law
M&A literature that provides empirical and theoretical bases for this
analysis. I also try to set a reasonable framework for future study of
this issue. The conclusion of this analysis is that efficiency
justifications cannot support the current reorganizations rules since
these rules apply to (and benefit) only some M&A transactions,
which may not necessarily be the most efficient M&A transactions.
Moreover, it is likely that these rules do not actually play a significant
role even in the materialization of the transactions they are supposed
to encourage. Their effect, therefore, is that of a subsidy to certain
participants in M&A transactions-an arbitrary, unfocused, and
hard-to-justify subsidy. In light of the significant costs and
ineffectiveness of such a subsidy, it is unlikely to be efficient.
Finally, Part IV concludes with a proposition to completely
repeal the reorganization provisions. I suggest that this will result in
significant simplicity and efficiency gains, and that such a repeal is
12. 1 base my analysis on the conclusions I reached in my historical analysis presented in
the Appendix for the benefit of the inexperienced tax reader. The Appendix reviews the
historical development and evolution of reorganizations. It further presents the few criticisms
of this regime as developed throughout the years. The argument that the reorganization rules
evolved through a rigid prism of a realization-based income tax, devoted to the maintenance of
realization as the fundamental feature of the system, was first observed by Professor Bank.
Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1 (2000). Bank
disposed of other rhetorical and historical arguments for reorganization rules, including the
contention that pressure to revive the depressed post-World War I economy resulted in many
measures, including easement of taxation of business and business combinations. One of these
measures was the enactment of the reorganization provisions that have remained substantially
unchanged, many years after those harsh economic pressures. See also Lovett, supra note 9, at
852.
13. The argument is implied in the legislative history and the academic literature.
Lovett, supra note 9, at 851-52.
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not unfair. Standard policy grounds cannot support the current
regime, which adds substantial complexity to the tax system.14
This Article is based on some strong assumptions. It assumes no
critical change in the current U.S. status quo regarding the optimal
size of the government, as well as the retention of the income tax
and its current realization-based version as the primary federal
method of taxation."5 Additionally, I assume that the United States
will continue to insist on preserving the classical corporate tax.' 6
14. I note that it is a mistake, from a policy perspective, to keep an unjustified current
regime just because we are short of effective, predictive tools to choose the "best" of available
alternatives where we do know that all of these alternatives are better than the current regime.
15. For example, I am assuming that there will be no switch to a federal consumption
tax. See, e.g., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM (Henry J. Aaron &
William S. Gale eds., 1996) (discussing various proposals for U.S. tax reform); JOEL SLEMROD
& JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 199-236 (2000) (reviewing and summarizing the
advantages and disadvantages of different U.S. proposals).
16. It may be useful to clarify the importance of this last assumption. Clearly,
corporations serve a central role in the current western economy. More than half of the U.S.
GDP originates in real corporations. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT 306, 322 (2000), available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/
fy2001/pdf/2000_erp.pdf. Corporations are fictional "legal entities," treated ambivalently by
the law. In some circumstances, their legal treatment equals the treatment of real (flesh-and-
blood) persons, and in others, it differs. Similar ambivalence exists in tax. The rhetoric of the
corporate tax is that it taxes corporations as separate legal persons. This is the essence of a
"classical" corporate tax system. Nevertheless, the IRC has a separate and different set of rules
for this tax-with independent tax rates, brackets, etc-for corporations (i.e., corporations are
not actually taxed as if they were human). This lack of consistency is hard to justify
intelligently. The current corporate tax is the product of sets of rules developed and tampered
with over the years depending on the political and economic setting. It is important to
remember, nevertheless, the revenue scope of this tax. It accounts for no more than fifteen
percent of federal tax collections. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2005-2014 tbl.F-3 (2003), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1821&sequence=0. Interestingly, the pattern I show here
with respect to reorganizations, i.e., staple rules without sound rationale or rigid original
assessment of the reason for their legislation, is similar to the pattern seen in the legislation of
the corporate tax itself. See Robert Clark, The Morpbogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 97 n.20 (1977). What is wrong with the
corporate tax? In principle, we all know that corporations, being fictional, do not pay taxes,
only real people do. This clich6 means that only flesh-and-blood persons can bear the
economic burden of taxation. The corporate tax, therefore, distorts the choice of organization
form. For further insights, see Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the
Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991). Then what is the corporate tax? One way to
look at it is as a means of collection, like a withholding tax system. In a similar sense, it
supports the integrity of the individual income tax in that it does not generally tax retained
earnings of the corporation at the level of the shareholders at the time these earnings are
generated, Clark, supra, at 101-03, although this is, obviously, not a necessary feature of the
system. Another common justification for the corporate tax is that it compensates society for
certain special privileges it provides corporations, mainly the limited liability for shareholders.
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The various regimes in Subchapter C of the Tax Code are all
interwoven in their complexity and must be untangled, one by one,
in order to allow real progress. This strategy allows us to ameliorate
the risk of irrelevant resistance, political or otherwise. My proposal to
repeal the reorganization preferences offers progress, but should not
be mistaken for a tax reform proposal that amends fundamental bases
of the system. Fundamental tax reforms are scarce, partly due to the
effectiveness of opposition that may not be directed at the whole
reform project, but rather at only some of its parts. An all-or-nothing
approach (such as the inclination to adopt the whole reform or
nothing) in tax may, at best, achieve a disappointing compromise;17
in reality, it usually achieves nothing, encouraging stagnation and
inefficiency.
II. THE REALIZATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT SUPPORT
NONRECOGNITION FOR REORGANIZATIONS
The traditional, stated justification for reorganization preferences
arises from the intuition that the subject transactions do not trigger
sufficient realization to justify their current taxation. 8 The federal
The most elementary, and probably the most important, justification for the corporate tax is
that large corporations do operate as separate persons; they exemplify real separation of
management from ownership, with little or no weight given to who the shareholders of the
corporation are at any given time. This trend will only grow in extent as capital markets
develop and become more sophisticated. Nevertheless, the "classical" corporate tax is clearly
distortive; it is not neutral since it creates a mix of incentives and disincentives to invest in
corporate business and/or capital. This and other arguments for and against the corporate tax
have been extensively developed elsewhere, and several proposals to replace the corporate tax,
or at least to introduce integration of the corporate tax and the taxation of corporate
distributions, have been made and rejected in the United States throughout the years. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & ALVIN C. WARREN JR., INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
REPORTS (1998). I do not attempt, therefore, to challenge the stability of the U.S. corporate
tax, rather, I endeavor to challenge a particularly wasteful part of it-the corporate
reorganization rules.
17. The tax reform of 1986 is a good, though clearly extraordinary, example of this
argument. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
18. Bank, supra note 12, at 12-13 (explaining that the favorable treatment of
reorganization transactions is part of the compromise between the consumption and accretion
models of taxation, which currently construct the federal tax system; and adding that given the
continuous struggle between these two models, it is still a logical part of the compromise).
Professor Bank mentions three arguments used to support tax-free reorganizations: (1) they
are pure "paper gains" and therefore should not be taxed, (2) they are justified as a post-World
War I economic revival measurement, and (3) it is administratively difficult to tax
reorganizations. Id. He argues that, eventually, it all boils down to realization. I fully agree
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income tax system is a realization-based system. It is also a mixed
system-part accretion tax, taxing income arising from capital, and
part consumption tax, exempting (or deferring) such income. 9 It is
based on income, with significant deviations from the classical
economic understanding of income,2" primarily through the
realization requirement for recognition of income and its taxation.
The realization requirement has been casuistically developed
throughout the years. 2' Currently, it is well established in the
regulations and other administrative materials that in order to tax a
taxpayer on any appreciation in the value of her property, a
realization event must take place first. Such an event occurs when
there is a "material change" in the investment or property held by
the taxpayer.22 In the case of T, the invention shareholder, for
example, the exchange of her InventCorp stock for IBM stock
constitutes such a material change and therefore is a realization
event.
The realization requirement is considered necessary since
without it, valuation hardship and liquidity concerns may arise and
cause the system to be perceived as unfair.2" Coming back to T, prior
to the merger it may be perceived as unfair to tax her on theoretical
appreciation in her InventCorp stock due to her success in
completing her invention project, since, like many other
entrepreneurs, she had no cash at that point in time and the value of
her shares was practically impossible to accurately estimate.
Nevertheless, I argue that neither of these basic justifications for a
general realization requirement in the income tax system can be
with this important observation, though, clearly, not with his conclusion. See also Clark, supra
note 16, at 117-18.
19. Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAx L. REV. 1 (1992).
20. This is the sum of change in net wealth, plus consumption, known as the Schanz-
Haig-Simons definition of income. ROBERT M. HAIG, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1921);
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938); Georg von Schanz, Der
Einkommensbegriffund die Einkommensteuergesetze, 13 FINANZARCHIV 1 (1896).
21. Dating back to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
22. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 556 (1991) (explaining that an
exchange of property gives rise to a realization event when the exchanged properties are
"materially different"-meaning they embody legally distinct entitlements); Treas. Reg. §
1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1996).
23. For some time, realization was even considered a constitutional requirement by the
Supreme Court; however, realization has been downgraded to an administrative convenience
or, as some may say, a necessary evil. David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1549, 1552 (1998).
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extended to justify an exception (nonrecognition resulting in further
deferral) to the standard application of this requirement for
reorganization transactions (T can easily sell her IBM shares for cash
now, and the value of her shares will be determined in a market
transaction). In this section, I echo past criticism of these
justifications and make some additional observations that support
such criticism.
A. The Prevalence of Realization as a Fundamental Concept
in the Tax System and the Creation of Mixed Signals
in the Reorganization Preference
A realization event does not create income, but rather serves as a
convenient point in time at which income can be measured and
added to the potential tax base of a taxpayer. It is understandable,
therefore, that two concerns are constantly raised in connection with
this requirement-valuation and liquidity. If the tax system does not
wait for a transaction-a realization event, well defined in both time
and real terms-it might be very hard and costly to annually assign
the right value to each relevant item of income for the purpose of tax
assessment. Moreover, once a transaction is effected, the taxpayer
materializes her investment and potentially receives funds to pay the
appropriate tax on it; however, this may not be the case in a
reorganization transaction where the taxpayer has not yet cashed out.
This latter (liquidity) argument is really two-pronged: first, the
taxpayer should have enough funds to physically pay the tax; and,
second, it is possible to argue that she must be able to pay the tax
from the same income on which it is levied. This latter rationale,
based on fairness intuitions, obviously ignores the fungible
characteristics of money, but may be strong politically since it allows
a taxpayer to feel safe that she does not have to "bring money from
home" in order to pay taxes on transactions in which she engages.
These intuitions follow the transaction tax features of the income tax
system. The schizophrenia of the system allows the reorganization
provisions to be presented as fair even though in reality they
represent a benefit granted discriminately to the more affluent.24
It is useful for my purposes to compare the realization-based
income tax with a pure mark-to-market tax system, under which
24. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Boom, Bust Felt Mainly by the Rich, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003, at
D2.
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personal wealth would be valued and taxed annually,2" since the
reorganization preferences represent a (favorable) exemption from
the general rule of realization and the mark-to-market system
represents a less favorable alternative regime than baseline realization
itself. This comparison should put into context the extent of
beneficial treatment embedded in the reorganization provisions. A
mark-to-market system would be hard to implement. Although
valuation methods have improved significantly, they are still quite
inaccurate when it comes to some assets. Moreover, the values of
some assets are traditionally subject to significant volatility, which
adds to the inaccuracy of the process and to its relatively large
exposure to abuse by taxpayers. A realization-based system, on the
other hand, partially 6 avoids the need and costs of valuation, since it
uses the transaction's market price. A pure mark-to-market system
may require a taxpayer who holds an appreciated asset to pay tax on
it before she has sold the asset, which may force her to sell the item
in order to have the cash to pay the tax. This last scenario arguably
shows the distortive potential effects of an income tax system that is
not based on realization, since the latter is closer to a cash-flow tax.
It does not require a taxpayer to pay tax before she actually realizes
her wealth. Appreciation of assets, under this logic, is only potential
income, and it materializes only when the taxpayer cashes in her
investment (sells the asset). It is apparent, therefore, that the deferral
benefit of nonrecognition for reorganizations is an excessive benefit,
in addition to the deferral benefit inherent in a realization-based
system, if we take a mark-to-market system as the baseline for the
analysis.
Rich literature analyzing potential alternatives to the realization-
based income tax system exists,27 followed by recent prorealization
literature countering such analysis.28 The success of the critical
25. This system would be the direct result of the elimination of the realization
requirement from the current system.
26. The valuation problem is not completely avoided since many transactions involve
related parties, thus forcing even a realization- based system to use some valuation trickery to
ensure the use of the "right" price.
27. See, e.g., David Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986).
28. Edward Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 861 (concluding that, choosing de novo,
we should elect realization rather than accretionism as a fundamental premise upon which to
construct an income tax, since its virtues are attainable and the appeal of accretionism is
theoretical and proved wrong when applied in the past; further arguing that accretionism can
literature has been, at most, limited to application of accretion-based
assessment provisions to specific items of income, either mandatory
or by election. It is reasonable to assume that this evolutionary
process will persist, but that complete replacement of the realization-
based system is unlikely. For the purposes of this Article this
assumption suffices.29 The messiness of the tax system, comprised of
a hodgepodge of provisions that affect the timing of taxation of
certain income in various ways, all of which deviate from the baseline
of realization but not in any apparently consistent or coherent way, is
exposed. These provisions apply to the same income items, but they
sometimes cancel each other out, partially or completely, without
sufficient justification. If we concentrate on the deferral benefit of
the realization concept, we acknowledge a general preference that
the tax system provides to investment and savings. Certain types of
investments, mainly in the financial area, are explicitly denied this
preference,3" while other, not substantially different, transactions are
granted an increased preference, since they are able to elect between
realization and mark-to-market regimes.3' From this perspective, the
signals of the system are hard to decipher. It gets even worse: other
types of nonrecognition transactions, including reorganizations,
receive increased (deferral) preference.32 With respect to these
transactions, the code signals dissatisfaction with the technical rules
of realization by stating that these transactions should not be taxed
even though realization has occurred. The inference is that the
realization in these transactions is not strong enough. Instead of
modifying the standard for realization, the code has constructed
another (similar) layer called "recognition." Normally, recognition
be applied, at most, sectorally and never universally, as realization can be applied). Schizer
argues that realization is a subsidy for private savings and investments, assuming that such a
subsidy is desirable. He concludes that, because it is credible, realization has a significant
advantage as a subsidy despite its disadvantages-mainly inefficiency. He adds that a pivotal
reason for its stability is that it doubles as a rule of administrative convenience. Schizer, supra
note 23, at 1601.
29. I do not intend to evaluate or criticize the possible alternatives to a realization -based
income tax system, as it has been ably done on several other occasions. I focus only on those
aspects that relate to reorganization transactions.
30. I.R.C. § 475 (2000) (mark-to-market accounting method for dealers in securities);
id. § 817 (treatment of variable contracts); id. § 1256 (marking to market certain contracts).
31. Id. § 460 (long-term contracts); id. § 475; I.R.C. § 1092 (straddle rules); id. §
1291 (passive foreign investment companies).
32. See, e.g., id. §§ 354, 361, 1031.
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follows realization automatically,33 but in certain cases it does not,
further extending the deferral preference. This extension is
particularly extravagant with respect to corporate reorganizations.34
After demonstrating the extraordinarily beneficial treatment of
reorganizations in a system lacking satisfactory coherence, I present
the stated argument for this preference, followed by its evaluation.
B. The Argument that Reorganizations Do Not Triger
"Sufficient" Realization
Shareholders in target corporations who exchange their shares
for something materially different from those shares experience a
realization event.3" All of the basic transactions would trigger
realization and recognition of gains under Section 1001(c) if it were
not for the reorganization provisions. The rationale for the
provisions is that even though technical realization may happen, i.e.,
shares or assets of one corporation are exchanged for shares in
another corporation, that realization did not happen substantively
since the value in the hands of the exchanging shareholders did not
change. Moreover, the same business continues, and the same
shareholders continue to own it, though now maybe through the
gossamer veil of a paper we call a corporation. The technique used to
implement this justice of not taxing shareholders undergoing
reorganization without frustrating the integrity of the realization
definition is to not recognze the income arising from the
transaction. It is easy to see, nevertheless, that the changes effected
in reorganizations are material. For example, look at the stock-for-
stock, type B reorganization. It cannot be true that the exchanging
33. Id. § 1001(c).
34. In order to fully understand the effect of the special tax preference to
reorganizations, we must start with an understanding of the tax effects of the corporate tax
subsystem. This is yet another mess of mixed signals of incentives and disincentives in relation
to a baseline of the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income. In this Article, I take the
reasonable assumption that the United States has, and will continue to have, a classical
corporate tax system. The basic effects of such a system are another level of taxation of
investments in corporate capital on one hand (the corporate tax) and a convenient deferral
opportunity on the other. Careful planning may allow not only the deferral of taxation of these
proceeds, but also its avoidance. The reorganization provisions magnify this deferral
preference, extending it beyond standard realization-capped periods.
35. This is true for shareholders of a target corporation in a merger, a stock-for-stock
transaction, and an assets-for-stock transaction. In the latter case, the shareholders in the target
corporation end up with stock from the acquiring corporation, which, in turn, acquires
substantially all the assets of the target corporation, which disappears in the process.
shareholders of the target corporation get an equivalent investment,
as they have diversified their investment by combining their business
with another business. The case of T and her exchange of
InventCorp stock for IBM stock in the merger is no different. If the
result is otherwise, the transaction should not have been entered into
in the first place.36
C. Analysis of the Realization -based Rationale for Reorganizations
Evaluation of the current reorganization provisions in light of
the realization-based justification is problematic because realization
itself is an elusive and sometimes vague (and even indefensible)
concept. Some observations can, nevertheless, be made.
1. Valuation hardships
The concern over valuation does not support the extension of
the realization preference to the case of reorganizations. Since any
reorganization technically triggers realization, there is a visible
market price used in the underlying transaction that can be properly
used to determine the gains or losses realized. At least in the context
of unrelated parties, this is one point in time when an arms-length
price may be established and monitored by methods already
employed by the code with respect to taxable acquisitions. 7 In the
related parties context, the extraction of an arms-length price may be
more difficult, but, again, we have specific provisions in the code to
deal with such situations." It may be argued that as we postpone the
taxing event we may be in a better position to accurately evaluate the
future market value,39 but in the case of corporations with long
horizons this argument is less convincing. The taxpayer sees only the
price that she could currently realize in cash terms.4"
As market prices are readily available, publicly traded stocks and
securities pose no valuation problem. A theoretical valuation
36. I obviously ignore purely tax-motivated reorganizations here.
37. 1.R-C. §§ 1001, 1060.
38. Id. § 482; Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (as amended in 2003). These provisions do require
some special valuation and enforcement costs; the tax authorities must understand the scope of
the transactions, so they may need to inquire into the whole set of relationships between the
parties to the transaction.
39. This is because the future market value is the present value of future inputs.
40. It is possible to argue that this price may not be well-reflected in the transaction
documents.
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problem may arise, therefore, only when purely nonpublicly traded
securities are exchanged.4' These cases should be relatively few in
number in comparison with exchanges in reorganizations that
involve publicly traded stock. Nevertheless, in most transactions it
does not seem to be very problematic to implement some basic rules
that will preserve the integrity of any valuation method allowed,
following accepted methods already found in other sections of the
code. First, the parties to the transaction must file reports that are
consistent with each other. Second, certain indicia must be reported,
such as information about prior private financing. Finally, if the
taxpayer fails to satisfy the authorities, then the taxpayer will bear the
costs of a valuation audit. These provisions should ameliorate the
possible problems of valuation in the rare cases where it is not simple
to figure out.
Another possible problem may be the valuation of different
business assets exchanged in stock-for-assets transactions. This
difficulty and possible innovative solutions have been ably discussed
elsewhere.42 For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that
even without major changes the code and regulations already provide
specific rules sufficient to regulate this issue should the
reorganization provisions be repealed.43
2. Liquidity concerns
Liquidity concerns may be more relevant to reorganizations than
the valuation concerns. The reorganization tax preference is exclusive
to transactions that use the stock of the acquiring corporation to
compensate the target shareholders for their shares of the target
corporation.' A target shareholder does not get any preference for
41. Even in these cases there are several ways to value the stock. See Shakow, supra note
27, at 1133-34 (reviewing some of these methods). Shakow, nevertheless, concludes that these
alternative methods are probably not very effective and prefers an ambitious revolution of the
tax system-elimination of the corporate tax or integration of the corporate tax with a tax on
corporate distributions. Id. at 1136-37. I prefer to limit this Article to a less ambitious scope. I
would put the valuation onus on the taxpayers. In most cases of unrelated parties, the market
should be able to guard the ight price, as in the current I.R.C. § 1060 provisions.
42. Shakow, supra note 27, at 1154-67.
43. I.RC. §§ 338, 1060; Treas. Reg. § 1.338 (as amended in 2003); id. § 1.1060 (as
amended in 2003).
44. Note that this is the case in all three relevant reorganizations-types A, B, and C. In
a merger and in a stock-for-stock reorganization, it is straightforward. In an assets-for-stock
reorganization, it is practically the same because the target corporation selling its assets is
required to be liquidated.
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cash received in the reorganization. Stock financing is a legitimate,
and sometimes reasonable, form of financing an M&A transaction.
But in many cases, the tax preference itself provides the strong
incentive to use stock rather than cash transactions, no matter what
method of financing is preferable pretax. In these cases, the liquidity
concern can be quite contrived and has no place in a serious policy
analysis. It is undesirable, therefore, to base a rule on taxpayers'
motivations here, so in order to dismiss this argument I must
determine whether the liquidity concerns are serious in the nontax-
driven cases.
Liquidity concerns are nonexistent in cases of publicly traded
stock and securities received by the target corporation's
shareholders.45  In the case of transactions involving private
corporations, a more careful look is appropriate, since private
corporations potentially include small businesses and shareholders
with possible real cash-flow concerns. From the perspective of the
main benefactors of the preferential tax treatment of the
reorganization provisions (the target shareholders),46 the only
relevant case is the one in which nonpublicly traded stock and
securities are exchanged for similar properties. The exchange of
publicly traded stock and securities for nonpublicly traded stock and
securities is possible, but unique. This latter situation signals financial
strength on the side of the taxpayers receiving stock and therefore
presents no real liquidity concerns. However, even the pure
exchange of nonpublicly traded stock and securities is likely to
involve mainly the wealthiest taxpayers in society.47 The problem,
therefore, cannot be technical inaccessibility to cash. Even if it were,
it could be solved by postponing payment of the tax and adding
45. Shakow, in his proposal to replace the realization-based system with a mostly accrual
system, has already discussed this. He emphasized that corporate equities account for 10.5% of
all assets held by individuals, out of which almost 85% were publicly traded stocks. See Shakow,
supra note 27, at 1132-33. This portion should be even more substantial when
reorganizations are involved.
46. The other prima facie "benefactor" of the nonrecognition of the realization event
is the acquiring corporation. This is, nevertheless, an issue unrelated to reorganization since
§ 1032, which I do not address in this Article, provides for nonrecognition to any
corporation issuing stock for other property, whether a reorganization is effected or not. For
further discussion, see infra Part IV.
47. Exceptional cases may involve amalgamations of small businesses and employee-
owned corporations.
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some interest charge.48 This solution can also be used where it is
determined that real liquidity concerns exist in transactions involving
private corporations.4 9
A somewhat related argument may be that taxpayers perceive it
as unfair to levy a tax prior to their cashing out. This perception may
be problematic only if it represents a real liquidity problem. The
perception itself may have some political bearing but should not
concern us in this normative analysis.5°
3. Realization as a credible subsidy to savings
Professor Schizer argues that realization may be a desirable
subsidy to private savings and investment because of its credibility."'
In the context of reorganizations, there is no doubt that it acts as a
very credible subsidy to certain investments in corporations. The
question is whether it is a desirable or an effective subsidy. The
answer in the case of reorganizations is different from Schizer's
positive answer with respect to realization in general, since
reorganizations are an exception to the regular realization rule. They
48. This technical solution resembles in principle one of the more interesting
alternatives to realization-based taxation-retrospective taxation plus interest charge. An
advantage of this solution is that it mitigates the liquidity concern without introducing new
significant distortions to the market for corporate control. For a discussion of this possible
solution, see Shakow, supra note 27, at 1176, in the context of his proposal to switch to an
accrual tax system. See also Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury: Charging Interest on Tax
Deferral Loans, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1988). For criticism, see Schizer, supra note 23.
49. It is a bad idea to apply different treatment to public and private corporations. See
Bank, supra note 12, at 42-43.
50. Only real liquidity concerns justify realization-based rationales. Another fairness
argument raised in connection with the liquidity argument is that taxing M&A transactions is
too oppressive on a small corporate shareholder who did not necessarily support the
transaction and now must sell her stock in order to pay the tax. Crockett suggests that this
problem, if it arises, be solved in the same way the code treats other involuntary transactions.
Ulysses S. Crockett, Jr., Federal Taxation of Corporate Unifications: A Review of Legislative
Policy, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1976). Crockett refers to § 1033, which provides nonrecognition
to taxpayers who suffer compulsory or involuntary conversion of their property if they replace
it, within a specified period, with similar property. Id. at 19 n.112. I do not think such a
solution is necessary from a fairness perspective, since such a taxpayer had to take this
possibility into account ex ante. Such a taxpayer does not necessarily have a liquidity problem. I
am not convinced by this fairness argument, but I do understand that it might be raised as part
of the political legislative process. Crockett's solution, therefore, may be useful in this context,
if required. It is not as harmful if applied only to true minority shareholders, since they do not
drive M&A transactions; therefore, the distorted effects would, at most, be minor.
51. Its credibility is evidenced by its stability as a fundamental concept in the tax system
throughout so many years, and the unlikelihood of any change in that stability. Schizer, supra
note 23.
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benefit a more exclusive and richer taxpayer group. Furthermore, I
show in Part III that the reorganization provisions are not, in
actuality, an effective subsidy to investments, since desired M&A
transactions take place notwithstanding their existence. The fact that
realization doubles as a rule of administrative convenience supports
its stability and possible desirability. The same is not true with
respect to the desirability of the reorganization preferences because
of their complexity, significant evasion opportunity, and significant
costs of their enforcement. Schizer himself mentions several
disadvantages of realization as a subsidy-disadvantages that weigh
even more against reorganization preferences."2
D. Realization and Perceptions of Fairness
Some argue that it is politically unrealistic to repeal the
realization requirement.5 3 The reason for this reality is that there are
basic irrational fairness perceptions among taxpayers.5 4 Professor
Zelinsky argues that "[s]ince realization-based taxation is
instinctively correct to many, if not most, taxpayers, [it] enhances
both democratic values and taxpayer compliance." 5 He backs this
argument with behavioral psychology theories of framing effects.5 6
This should not affect my analysis and proposal, since there is no
parallel between the perceptions of realization and the perceptions of
reorganization preferences, which represent an exception to
realization. The effect of these reorganization preferences is, simply
put, the deferral of taxation of some investors in corporations. Much
of that is due to the notorious wasteful complexity and exclusive
planning opportunities reorganization preferences introduce to the
system. It would be preposterous to argue that reorganization
52. The disadvantages are as follows: (1) less than optimal allocation of resources (as I
analyze in Part IV); (2) the fact that effectiveness varies with the capital gains rate; (3) the fact
that it is less credible than an upfront subsidy, possibly ineffective, and counterproductive (as I
analyze in Part IV); and (4) the fact that realization favors "growth" stock over debt and
"income" stock (this is particularly severe in reorganizations). Taxation will not solve the debt-
equity distortion but will ameliorate it and eliminate the distortion to "income" stock.
Additionally, it does not address a specific market failure that justifies intervention-that there
is not enough savings, mainly because the government taxes income rather than consumption
and runs a budget deficit. Schizer, supra note 23, at 1609-10, 1612, 1617-18, 1621-22.
53. Shaviro, supra note 19.
54. Zelinsky, supra note 28, at 893-900.
55. Id. at 893.
56. Id. at 898-900.
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preferences enhance democratic values and compliance, since they
represent the exact opposite: inequality in treatment of
interchangeable types of investments and the epitome of tax
planning.
III. EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TAX-FREE REORGANIZATIONS
Efficiency has not been explicitly stated in the legislative history
as a justification for the enactment, or preservation, of the
reorganization provisions. The legislative history took for granted
that the reorganization provisions allow businesses flexibility and
promote efficient transactions. This "intuition" was present in all the
relevant debates but never directly studied or discussed. 7 Reading
between the lines, however, proves that this "intuition" materially
contributed to the stability of the reorganization provisions.5 8 They
continued to evolve and develop, endogenously, without any
rethinking or evaluation of their actual consequences.5 9
In this section I challenge the validity of this assumption-that
the reorganization provisions encourage efficiency-as a justification
for their continuance. For this purpose, I depend on the extensive
empirical and other economic, business, and corporate law M&A
literature of the past two decades. The standard analysis of takeovers
is based on the fact that internal growth is difficult, especially when it
is needed to cover, or recover from, corporate underperformance.
Therefore, corporations direct their growth efforts to the market for
corporate control-a more flexible market than the product market.
In some cases, some industries' needs for an overhaul restructuring
(since they face deregulation, for instance) triggered or reinforced
their redirection to the market for corporate control. Nevertheless,
this simple picture has proven more complicated at second glance.
57. It has not been seriously studied even by academics. Professor Lovett argued that
mergers should meet a market test for efficiency, but he has not comprehensively detected the
actual efficiency consequences of mergers. It should be noted that he did not have the rich
empirical data we have today. Lovett, supra note 9, at 853. Professor Shaviro briefly discussed
reorganizations in his analysis of the efficiency benefits of realization, accepting the choice of
Congress in this area; however, he pointed to the same problems on which I elaborate here.
Nevertheless, if we take his major points, we can see that the reorganization rules do not fare
well. This is not surprising, since they are an unjustified exception to the potentially efficient
realization rules. Of course, most of the data presented in this Article was not available to
Professor Shaviro at the time he wrote his article-pre- 1992. See Shaviro, supra note 19.
58. See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 9.
59. As did all of Subchapter C of the IRC. See Clark, supra note 16, at 92-93 (from
whom I borrowed the above morphogenetic metaphor).
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Recent study shows that multiple factors affect M&A activity and
motivations. Moreover, these factors are dynamic-they change as
market circumstances change, making the analysis even more difficult
since the perspective of time may be needed to even identify these
factors. Nevertheless, certain patterns can be identified, allowing me
to reach the conclusion that the reorganization provisions cannot be
a priori justified on efficiency grounds since they represent a group
of transactions that is not identifiably more desirable than other
M&A transactions. In fact, it may be less desirable. I also show that
the reorganization rules do not play a decisive role even in the
initiation of the transactions they are supposed to encourage, which
makes them ineffective and wasteful even with respect to those
transactions. I start this section with background that should provide
some common ground for the discussion, followed by a
reconstruction of the possible efficiency arguments supporting the
reorganization provisions and an analysis of their validity in light of
the external literature.
A. Background
1. Taxation and neutrality
In order to effectively apply the wisdom of this external (nontax)
literature to a tax discussion, I need to add some background notes
on both the tax system and the external analysis of M&A
transactions. I start with tax. It is a basic concept of tax law that its
rules come into play only after the application of private law rules,
primarily those of property and commercial law. For example, if I sell
a picture that has appreciated in value since I bought it, I, as a
taxpayer, should realize this increase in value (and recognize it) as a
taxable gain, but this is true only if I were actually the owner of the
picture and if the transaction I engaged in were actually a sale. This
concept, although fundamental, is not cogent, since in certain cases
the tax law deviates from private law consequences. Such deviation
may be justified by anti-avoidance reasons,6" as well as administrative
60. For example, a sale of certain intellectual property is not economically different from
licensing it for a long (enough) term; but the tax consequences may be significantly different,
especially at the international level where a withholding tax is imposed on royalty payments but
not on sale proceeds. For this reason, taxpayers have tried to disguise licenses as sales
contingent upon performance, profits, etc. One legislative answer has been § 881(a)(4), which
taxes gains "flavored" with royalty features similar to royalties.
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convenience and political reasons. Any deviation must have a good
reason, since it represents the exception rather than the rule.
A fundamental tax policy concept that follows is the requirement
that tax laws be neutral; they should perform their task of taxation
without affecting, i.e., distorting, the business and investment
decisions of taxpayers. Neutrality is a central characteristic of an
efficient tax system,6 which performs its task to provide governments
with funds they can use to finance public goods for their
constituents. However, in our second-best world, no tax system can
be completely neutral.62 Corporate taxation is, by definition, not
neutral, since it taxes legal persons who do not bear the actual
incidence of the tax. At the very basic level, the corporate tax
provides a disincentive to invest and do business through
corporations.63 The reorganization provisions are also not neutral. 6'
They provide an opposite incentive-to operate through
corporations, since they represent a benefit that can only be enjoyed
if one does just that. The benefit is, as already mentioned, tax-
deferral treatment of certain transactions using (primarily)6" stock as
consideration, and only to the extent of that stock consideration.
61. Neutrality and efficiency are not synonymous; nevertheless, since the tax system
operates in an imperfect market, a nonneutral tax system may still be efficient, provided that it
"corrects" market failures. This distinction is, however, mainly theoretical, since the whole
analysis is effectively in a second-best world.
62. Lump-sum taxes are basically neutral but politically impossible, as proved by the
classic example of the Thatcher Administration's attempts to implement them in the United
Kingdom in 1990. For a good review, see HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 282-87 (6th ed.
2002).
63. This is not so simple, though, since different provisions of Subchapter C provide
contradicting incentives. See Clark, supra note 16.
64. The corporate tax itself underlies this issue since it distorts incentives to do business
and investments through corporate entities versus other entities, but this problem is beyond
my scope. I assume here that the corporate tax is here to stay, and I will take it, therefore, as a
given. Further, I do not intend here to evaluate whether the reorganization provisions should
be neutral, whether they are neutral enough, or other similar questions, which will be partly
discussed below. For the effect of the reorganization provisions on M&A transactions, see
James W. Wansley et al., Abnormal Returns to Acquired Firms by Type of Acquisition and
Method of Payment, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1983, at 16, 16-22 (observing significantly higher
returns to target shareholders compensated mainly with cash, in comparison to those
compensated mainly with stock, and concluding that these should be attributed to the tax
effect). For a more detailed analysis, see Carla Hayn, Tax Attributes as Determinants of
Shareholder Gains in Corporate Acquisitions, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 121 (1989).
65. Current rules allow mergers to qualify as reorganizations if at least 40% of the
consideration is in any type of stock. They demand 100% voting stock consideration in type
"B" (stock-for-stock) reorganizations, and at least 80% voting stock consideration in type "C"
(assets-for- stock) reorganizations. I.R.C. § 368(a)-(c) (2000).
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Simply put, the parameters most relevant in tax law to attain this
benefit are that the transactions have primarily stock consideration,
the benefit is given only to stock consideration, the transactions are
founded on appropriate motives (only business reasons qualify as
such), a significant part of the former shareholders maintains equity
risk in the surviving entity, and a significant continuity of the old
business, or its assets, is maintained. The deviation of these rules
from neutrality should, therefore, have a convincing reason. I claim
in this Article that the reorganization law does not have any reason
in general, and in this section I demonstrate that it could not be
justified by efficiency in particular.
2. The basic concerns of the external literature
The external literature66 is more concerned with different features
of M&A transactions than with the tax rules. It focuses on
regulation, competition, and corporate governance. Therefore it
primarily studies market power, efficiency, and internal agency
problems. The most significant mutually relevant parameter between
this literature and the concerns of tax law is the type of consideration
used in the transaction. Other important issues studied by this
literature are the phenomenon of M&A "waves," defined by the
increase in both number and volume of such transactions in modern
times, the hostile features of the transaction, and the classification of
vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate transactions. 67 The purpose of
these studies is to better understand why corporations enter into
M&A transactions and the social consequences of these transactions.
They result in a weak understanding that M&A transactions are
socially beneficial on average, i.e., they create wealth instead of just
redistributing it from one sector to another. This, however, does not
fully explain the continuing motivations of corporations to enter this
risky and extremely costly game. These motivations may vary and are
not very clear or simple.
It is common to divide M&A transactions into waves. The first
M&A wave peaked at the turn of the century, creating, in
predominantly horizontal combinations, some of the largest
66. For example, the economic, business, and corporate law literature.
67. In a vertical merger, the transaction is between entities that have a buyer-seller
relationship. In a horizontal merger, the transaction is between competitors, and in a
conglomerate merger it is between firms in unrelated businesses (i.e., they are not competitors
and do not have a buyer-seller relationship of any kind).
[2004
1] Preferential Tax Treatment for Reorganizations
monopolies of our time.6" The second wave, lasting from 1916 to
1929, practically continued this pattern, but since the antitrust
environment of the period was stricter, it consisted mainly of the
consolidation of industries and resulted in oligopolistic rather than
monopolistic structures.69 The next wave was delayed until the
second part of the 1960s. During the four interim decades, antitrust
legislation continued to tighten, and M&A activity was concentrated
in smaller firms and, many times, had tax rather than business
motivations.7° Asset acquisitions, in particular, thrived because they
were not covered by the Clayton Act until 1950.71 This changed
with the third wave, which introduced big conglomerates taking
advantage of a booming economy and favorable tax and accounting
treatments through, among other tactics, the increased use of stock
as compensation to target shareholders.72 Today we know that
conglomerates failed as a business model and reduced social wealth
rather than increasing it.73 The fourth wave, in the 1980s, was
evidently the first to contribute to the efficiency of the market,
introducing hostile takeovers to the business scene. z4 It took place in
a decade of large economic expansion, including some noticeable
international involvement for the first time. This wave was
characterized by the increased use of debt to finance M&A
transactions. Takeover specialists dominated both tactical and
strategic aspects of the market. After a mild recession, the 1990s
brought about its own M&A wave, which in many aspects combined
68. PATRICK GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 23 (3d ed. 2002).
69. Id. at 28.
70. Id. at 32.
71. The Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950 closed this loophole. See id. at 33.
72. Id. at 32-37.
73. One explanation is that, currently, diversification at the corporate level is just too
expensive. Nevertheless, ample evidence makes it doubtful that there is any desirability for
conglomerate transactions. Henry Servaes, The Value of Diversification During the
Conglomerate Merger Wave, 51 J. FIN. 1201 (1996) (stating conglomerates were valued at a
discount, on average, during the 1960s third merger wave). Current literature on
diversification in general provides interesting parallels in its findings that both industrial and
global (geographical) diversifications are, on average, value-destroying. Lance A. Nail et al.,
How Stock-swap Mergers Affect Shareholder (and Bondholder) Wealth: More Evidence of the
Value of Corporate 'Focus," 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 95 (1998) (using a sample of pure stock
mergers from 1963-1996 and showing disappointing results to bondholders in
conglomerates); see David J. Denis et al., Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and
Firm Value (Aug. 2001), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstracts=244721.
74. GAUGHAN, supra note 68, at 44.
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the third and fourth waves (however, the first two waves were
considered anticompetitive and therefore existed in a substantially
different legal and business environment). 7 The typical fifth-wave
M&A transaction was strategic (rather than financially
opportunistic), increasingly using equity financing; it was less hostile
than the transactions of the 1980s and much more international in
scope.76 In general, the typical fifth-wave M&A transaction seemed
to be a more efficient, synergy-gains-driven M&A transaction. 7 The
variety and constant evolution of these transactions may place in
question our ability to correctly match tax rules that will correlate
with the desirable features of M&A.
Another important part of the external literature focuses on the
distinction (ignored by the tax analysis of reorganizations) between
hostile and friendly transactions following the 1980s fourth wave of
M&A transactions. Hostility in a takeover bid has been attacked as
threatening shareholders and management, forcing them to
implement wasteful defensive mechanisms,78 and revered as the
market mechanism to discipline and/or replace inefficient
management.79 In reality, it is not easy to identify such hostility and
use it as a meaningful feature, since "most transactions contain
elements of both friendly and hostile deals." 8 Moreover, recent
evidence proves that hostility in takeover negotiations is most
strongly related to strategic bargaining by the target and is
significantly less related to management entrenchment.81 Therefore,
75. As does most of the external literature I review, I basically ignore these two first
waves.
76. GAUGHAN, supra note 68, at 51-54.
77. Caution is needed, however, since perspective and several other analytical tools may
be required to comprehensively evaluate it.
78. Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et
al. eds., 1988).
79. Id. The classical article promoting this basic story of takeovers and their benefits is
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965).
80. G. WILLIAM SCHWERT, HOSTILITY IN TAKEOVERS: IN THE EYES OF THE
BEHOLDER? 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7085, 1999), available at
http://%wvw.nber.org/papers/w7085.
81. Id. at 31-33. Interestingly, in spite of the dominance of the bargaining explanation
to hostility, there is no strong and conclusive evidence on the superiority of hostility in terms
of the premiums received, even though this inconclusiveness seems to be due to the hardship
of defining and identifying hostility. Id. at 20-25. See also John C. Coates IV, Takeover
Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271
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the level of hostility changes over time and has no inherent
distinguishable features.82 Hostility in a transaction is thus just
another way to maximize the consideration to the target
shareholders. One conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis is
that hostility should have no distinguishable direct tax consequences,
since it does not change the nature of the transaction, it is vaguely
defined, and it is very hard to identify and quantify. On the other
hand, there is evidence that hostility may impact the efficiency of
transactions. A set of studies of hostile and friendly transactions
concluded that these are two completely different processes that
target "very different companies and hence should not be treated as
examples of the same economic process."83 Shleifer and Summers
added: "[I]t would be a serious conceptual mistake to use the data
on friendly acquisitions to interpret theories of hostile takeovers., 84
From my perspective, we do expect hostility to result in different
types of consideration, since we do not expect stock to be very
attractive in a hostile context. This expectation is somewhat
supported by the evidence.85 Nevertheless, the low likelihood that
only equity will be offered in a hostile context 86 makes it harder and
costlier for such a transaction to qualify as a reorganization.
Reorganizations that completely disallow "boot" (payment in a form
other than the stock of the bidding corporation) are the costliest and
most improbable.87 In this Article I will not discuss this distinction
(2000) (confronting academia's attack on poison pills with evidence that defenses were used
not for management entrenchment purposes but rather for bargaining purposes, supporting
the bargaining explanation to hostility). Coates developed the notion that it is enough to know
that a poison pill could be adopted anytime for its effect to be felt ("shadow pill"), and
explained that share prices do not fall upon the actual adoption of the pill. Rather, prices
already have adjusted to the "shadow pill." His article emphasizes two major problems in the
research of M&A transactions: (1) the never-ending methodological debate, which casts doubt
on the usefulness of any study in the field; and (2) the multiplicity of relevant factors that
makes the research so complex.
82. In fact, in the 1990s, takeovers tended to be less hostile. Joseph H. Flom, Mergers
and Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 753, 761-62 (2000).
83. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 48 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988):
see also Randall Morck et al., Characteristics of Hostile and Friendly Takeover Targets, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988);
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process, 2 J.
ECON. PERSP. 7 (1988).
84. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 83, at 48.
85. SCHWERT, supra note 80, at 8,
86. Id.
87. That is the type B, stock- for-stock, reorganization. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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separately but as part of the general discussion of the important
distinction between cash and stock transactions.
Another important distinction that has no tax consequences is
the distinction between vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate
transactions. The tax law requires "a" business purpose, but is
basically silent as to the type of business purpose required.88 Even the
continuity-of-business requirement does not necessarily mandate that
the target's business will be continued, since it suffices that the old
business's assets are used in "a" business." One could expect
different motivations for conglomerate and nonconglomerate
transactions. The evidence has proven this idea to be true, presenting
different efficiency benefits to these two categories of M&A
transactions, which transactions are still ignored by tax law. This
point may be moot in light of the current unpopularity of
conglomerate transactions.
3. Neutralizing the effect of taxation on current studies
Finally, I attempt to normatively evaluate the tax rules applying
to M&A transactions as if they had occurred in a completely neutral,
unrealistic tax world. In the real world examined by the external
literature, taxation affects M&A transactions in two ways: first,
corporations engage in transactions because there are tax attributes
(potential benefits) that may be better utilized by the combined
corporation (tax synergy); and second, corporations engage in
transactions because there are tax benefits to shareholders, i.e., tax
deferral in certain transactions and circumstances through the
reorganization provisions. It is important to distinguish between the
two. In this Article, I only examine and question the justification for
the latter. The former plays a role in the motivation system for M&A
transactions. I will refer to it and explain it together with the other
factors, although I can say that its role is not entirely clear to me at
the present." The external literature assumes the tax regime of its
88. BI-rKER & EUSTICE, supra note 8, 12.61[1].
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2001).
90. Hayn, supra note 64, at 148 (providing evidence that tax attributes of the target are
significant in explaining the abnormal returns to the target's shareholders, and suggesting that
tax considerations do motivate acquisitions, i.e., successful "reorganization" increases the
likelihood of completion of the transaction). Note that some of the studies in this field took
place prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
when additional distortions between taxable transactions and reorganizations existed.
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time, including the reorganization provisions, as a given, and since
my goal here is to normatively evaluate these, I try to neutralize their
effect.
B. Are M&A Transactions Efficient?
The first prong of an efficiency justification for reorganizations
must be that M&A transactions are generally wealth-creating,9
socially desirable transactions in and of themselves.92 For my
purposes, this is only the first step, since the reorganization
provisions apply to (and benefit) only stock transactions. If we isolate
stock transactions from the general M&A population, most (or all)
of the social value of these transactions disappears.9" The results are
91. The bulk of the available studies show that M&A transactions are, in general, wealth
creating. Jensen, supra note 78; Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and
Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 124 n.13 (1992); MICHAEL C. JENSEN & DONALD H.
CHEW, U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FROM THE 1980s, at 6-7 (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Negotiation, Organizations and Markets, Research Paper No. 00-02, 1995). Current
European studies show similar results to U.S. studies. See M. Goergen & L. Renneboog,
Shareholder Wealth Effects in Large European Takeover Bids (Feb. 4, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Results in the United Kingdom are also similar to U.S.
results. S. GIRMA ET AL., MERGER ACT=vrY AND EXECUTIVE PAY (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Research, Discussion Paper No. 3255, 2002) (concentrating on executive pay and finding that
shareholders had relative success in penalizing management engaged in mergers that did not
create wealth to shareholders and were motivated by management interests). In Germany the
market was just recently created as a result of deregulation. MARTIN HOPNER & GREGORY
JACKSON, AN EMERGING MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL? THE MANNESMANN
TAKEOVER AND GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Max-Planck-Institut hir
Gesellschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper 01/4, 2001) (describing this process and concluding
that, currently, efficiency effects of the process are questionable). A 1999 survey conducted by
KPMG revealed that 83% "of mergers were unsuccessful in producing any business benefit as
regards shareholder value." Unlocking Shareholder Value: The Keys to Success (KPMG, London,
U.K.), Nov. 1999, at 2, http://www.kpmg.com/Rut2OOO.prod/Documents/9/
MA%202001.pdf. KPMG's 2001 survey found this figure to be 70%. World Class Transactions
(KPMG, London, U.K), 2001, at 5, http://www.kpmg.com/Rut2000_prod/Documents/
9/KPMGMA_2001_web-new.pdf.
92. Of course, it is theoretically possible that although M&A transactions are inefficient
pre-tax, the imposition of tax will make them efficient, but this construction is completely
unreasonable in my context so I ignore it.
93. The specific motivations that drive these transactions may be irrelevant to this
discussion, even if they result in wealth transfers between sectors of society (mainly
shareholders to managers). Romano, supra note 91, at 124 n.15. This is, nevertheless,
debatable since one may argue that although motivations as such are not important to tax
policy determinations, redistribution effects are, especially when significant dollar amounts are
involved. Jensen, supra note 78, at 315-16 (referring to an estimation by Paulus that target
shareholders shared approximately $75 billion of $239 billion worth of M&A transactions in
1984 and 1985). For the purposes of this Article, I ignore the effects of redistribution, since it
is unclear how significant these effects are and, in any case, these effects cannot support the
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worse for conglomerate transactions.94 These results are problematic
to the efficiency-based justification of the reorganization provisions,
since they supposedly encourage the less-efficient type of M&A
transactions. Next, I elaborate on the efficiency properties of stock
transactions (standing alone) in comparison with cash transactions,
and conclude that they are not more desirable than cash transactions
on efficiency grounds.
1. The importance of the method of payment
The vast literature demonstrates that the method of payment
plays a significant role in M&A transactions and affects their
consequences. The extent, and sometimes even the existence, of the
effects of the method of payments are not always clear. It is clear,
however, that this literature cannot support a claim that stock
transactions are superior to cash transactions."
M&A transactions result in a puzzling variety of consequences to
the participants. Probably the least intuitive consequence is the
relatively small returns to the acquiring corporation's shareholders in
comparison with the target shareholders. These returns are
particularly small (and even nonexistent or negative according to
some studies) in transactions using stock to compensate the target
corporation or its shareholders.96 With respect to the transactions as
a whole, these studies have been fairly consistent in finding that cash
M&A transactions generate value to shareholders on both sides of
the transaction, and are, on average, both economically and
statistically efficient. Stock transactions, on the other hand, have
consistently been inferior to cash transactions. However, on average,
they are still believed to create value to shareholders as a general
group, although the acquiring corporation's shareholders do not
current tax regime, but rather add a fairness criticism to my other criticisms of this regime
(assuming, very simply, that managers are, on average (no matter how one calculates it) much
more wealthy than shareholders).
94. As the costs of diversification to individuals decrease and capital markets expand and
become more easily and cheaply accessible, it is less attractive to investors to use corporations
to sufficiently diversify their portfolio. This way they avoid the nominal and agency costs and
other inefficiencies involved with doing it through (particularly) the conglomerate structure.
95. See, e.g., studies mentioned infra note 97.
96. For a review of these studies, see Kenneth J. Martin, The Method of Payment in
Corporate Acquisitions, Investment Opportunities, and Management Ownership, 51 J. FIN.
1227, 1227-28 (1996).
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reap the bulk of this benefit.97 Stock transactions, therefore, have
been found to be generally inferior, or at least not superior, to cash
transactions from the perspective of wealth creation. The inferiority
of stock transactions is evident not only in studies of announcement-
period returns, but also in studies of postacquisition returns and
poor operating performance after the transaction.98 Studies of
transaction forms found similar results that demonstrated the
superiority of tender offers over mergers. These results are logical
since seldom will tender offers use stock, though it is becoming
97. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 78, at 335-36; James W. Wansley et al., Gains to Bidder
Firms in Cash and Securities Transactions, 22 FIN. REV. 403 (1987); see also B. Espen Eckbo &
Herwig Langohr, Information Disclosure, Method of Payment, and Takeover Premiums, 24 J.
FIN. ECON. 363 (1989) (showing that, in France, abnormal returns to target shareholders are
related to the form of payment); B. Espen Eckbo et al., Asymmetric Information and the
Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 651 (1990) (similar
results in Canada, including when checking mixes of cash and stock as compensation in
takeovers); Julian R. Franks et al., Means of Payment in Takeovers: Results for the United
Kingdom and the United States, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
221 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (same results in the United Kingdom); Robert G. Hansen,
A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions, 60 J. Bus. 75 (1987);
Yen-Sheng Huang & Ralph A. Walkling, Target Abnormal Returns Associated with Acquisition
Announcements, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 348 (1987) (same results in the United States);
Nikolaos G. Travlos, Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firm? Stock
Returns, 42 J. FIN. 943 (1987). For a recent study confirming these results see ERWAN
MORELLEC, THE DYNAMICS OF MERGER AND ACQUISITIONS (Simon Sch. of Bus., Working
Paper No. FR 01-11, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/
SSRNID281534_code010830590.pd.abstractid=281534.
Other studies show consistent results, except they find negative total returns in stock
transactions. See, e.g., Servaes, supra note 73. But see Saeyoung Chang, Takeovers of Privately
Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns, 53 J. FIN. 773 (1998). Chang finds
different results-positive abnormal returns in stock offers (and none in cash offers) when the
target is privately held. However, a recent Australian study also sampling privately held targets
finds different results from Chang consistent with the majority of studies of publicly traded
targets mentioned above. RAYMOND DA SILVA ROSA ET AL., THE EQUITY WEALTH EFFECTS
OF METHOD OF PAYMENT IN TAKEOVER BIDS FOR PRIVATELY HELD FIRMS (Univ. of W.
Austl., Working Paper No. 2001-138, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNjID269212_codeO10510600.pdf?.abstractid=269212.
98. Martin, supra note 96, at 1228; Nicholas F. Carline et al., The Influence of
Managerial Ownership on the Real Gains in Corporate Mergers and Market Revaluation of
Merger Partners: Empirical Evidence (Eur. Fin. Ass'n 2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper,
2002) (presenting similar data on a recent U.K. sample, but not when excess cash is involved),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN-ID302606_code020321600.
pdfabstractid=302606. Then it is consistent with Jensen's free cash flow theory, discussed
infra note 148. But see Randall Heron & Erik Lie, Operating Performance and the Method of
Payment in Takeovers, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 137 (2002). They provide also a
good summary of prior studies and demonstrate the methodological difficulties of constructing
such a study. Id. at 137-39.
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increasingly popular in mergers." The narrow way to interpret these
results is to say that, although weak, the efficiency-based explanation
of the reorganization rules withstands these results since it is still
possible that without reorganizations these (although relatively
minor) efficiency benefits will be lost. Another possible
interpretation is that the bias embedded in the reorganization rules
in favor of the use of stock in M&A transactions is inefficient, since,
if anything, it encourages the less efficient stock transactions and
perhaps discourages the more efficient cash transactions. Moreover,
studies to date do not separate transactions that benefit from the
reorganization provisions from other taxable stock transactions. We
do not know, therefore, if reorganizations are efficient in general.
Such a conclusion cannot be deduced from the weak and disputable
evidence that stock transactions are generally wealth-creating. Clear
and direct evidence is not available, but its acquisition may be a
worthwhile future project.
Why, then, is the use of stock increasingly popular in M&A
transactions? There are many practical elements supporting the
preference of stock payments. The first centers on funding concerns.
A major obstacle to a cash transaction is obviously the need for
cash, '0 which may be unavailable or very costly to raise quickly and
in large volumes. Stock, on the other hand, has become a cheaper
and more prevalent currency in the past decades. Another reason for
the preference given to stock transactions is that managers like to pay
with stock since it allows them increased flexibility in current and
future investment opportunities.' The evidence shows a strong
correlation between stock payments in M&A transactions and
greater investment opportunities for the acquiring firm,"0 2 which, in
99. Michael J. Fishman, Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in
Acquisitions, 44 J. FIN. 41 (1989). Another distinction that is similar is the distinction between
hostile and friendly transactions, since in the hostile setting the bidder is basically forced to use
a tender offer and cash. These studies are related and their results correlate, so I do not devote
separate discussions to them. See Huang & Walkling, supra note 97, at 348, with respect to
the relations between cash transactions, hostile bids, and takeovers on one hand, and stock
transactions, friendly bids, and mergers on the other hand.
100. J. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing
Mega-Mergers (May 22, 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/
000421558.pdf.abstractid=223149.
101. Martin, supra note 96, at 1243.
102. Id. at 1228 (consistent with and referring to KOOYUL JUNG ET AL., INVESTMENT
OPPORTUNITIES, MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, AND THE SECURITY ISSUE DECISION (Nat'l
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contrast to most of the evidence presented in this Article, is not an
undesirable aspect of stock transactions. Of course, it is hard to
distinguish in this context between real opportunities and
management opportunism, so the bottom line may not be positive
regarding stock transactions after all. In other circumstances, cash
transactions can be connected to management opportunism-the use
of available cash for empire-building rather than for distribution to
the shareholders.' °3 Stock transactions may also be preferred from a
public-relations perspective, since it may be easier to "sell" a merger
as a "merger of equals" rather than as a cash transaction that will
look riore like a "sale" of one corporation to the other.0 4 Target
managers that also own stock in the target corporation like stock
transactions because the managers are more likely to retain jobs in
the surviving firm if they are also shareholders.'0 5
These explanations are insufficient to fully account for the extent
of the use of stock in M&A transactions, however. As demonstrated
in the next section, most of the literature concentrates on the effects
of both incentives and signals to the market that result from
information asymmetry with respect to the true value of either the
target or the acquiring corporation in the M&A context on decisions
regarding the method of payment. 06 Hansen has developed the
theory that the acquiring corporation has an incentive to pay the
target with stock because if the acquiring corporation overpays for
the target, target shareholders now holding shares in the acquiring
corporation will share some of that risk.0 7 Cash payments signal that
the risk of overpayment is considered low or that the acquiring
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4907, 1995), available at http://
papers.nber.org/tmp/43608-w4907.pdf).
103. This is consistent with Jensen's free cash flow theory, discussed infra note 148.
104. See infra note 148.
105. See Aloke Ghosh & William Ruland, Managerial Ownership, the Method of Payment
for Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention, 53 J. FIN. 785, 797 (1998). This is consistent
with Martin, supra note 96, at 1228, 1244. See also Yakov Amihud et al., Corporate Control
and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 45 J. FIN. 603
(1990); Ren6 M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market
for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1988).
106. This is consistent with the general theory about asymmetric information and stock
issuance. See, e.g., Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187
(1984).
107. Hansen, supra note 97.
corporation is assigning a high value to the target. °8 Another aspect
of this theory is that high-value bidders, or bidders with private
information that they are themselves undervalued, are more reluctant
to use stock in an acquisition since they want to preserve the value
potential of their stock for their own shareholders (assuming that
there is an alignment of interests between management and
shareholders)." 9 Information about possible synergies that may
result from the merger is also in effect factored into the share price
and may affect the negotiation over the method of payment used.
This theory reinforces my discomfort with the current reorganization
rules. These rules benefit only transactions that supposedly prbvide a
bad signal that the management of the acquiring corporation is
predicting a risk that it may overpay for the target in the transaction.
On the other hand, they do not benefit transactions that provide a
good signal of prosperity and high cash flow in the acquiring
corporation."'
Finally, of course, tax rules could be the reason for the use of
stock in M&A transactions due to their preferential treatment of
certain stock transactions. The importance of tax as a factor in M&A
transactions deserves a separate section, which follows, since it is at
the heart of my argument and takes the analysis a step forward.
Nevertheless, to complete my analysis in this section, I note that tax
treatment cannot explain the full difference in value creation between
cash and stock transactions."' Tax does play a major role in a
corporation's decision to use stock rather than cash in a transaction.
However, tax treatment is not such a driving force behind the
decision to actually enter into a transaction, although some
transactions are tax-driven and lack any additional business-related
purpose." 2
108. Fishman, supra note 99. Fishman shows that this signal (cash offer) is also effective
in deterring other bidders from competing with an acquiring corporation that offers cash in a
bid. See also THOMAS FIELDS & THOMAS LYS, OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE CONSIDERATION
IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Working Paper, 2000), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN-ID239723_codeOOO919510.pdfpabstractid=239723). See
Martin, supra note 96, for support of the asymmetric information theory.
109. This is true even when mixed payments are made. Eckbo and others found that
higher-valued bidders are more likely to use more cash in M&A transactions. Eckbo et al.,
supra note 97.
110. Romano, supra note 91, at 123 n.1l.
111. Franks et al., supra note 97. In the United Kingdom, prior to the introduction of
the capital gains tax, similar results are evidenced. Id. at 221.
112. We expect these latter transactions to be generally inefficient.
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1 Preferential Tax Treatment for Reorganizations
In conclusion, I found no valid argument that supports the grant
of tax benefits to stock transactions in particular."' The
reorganization rules apply solely to stock transactions (and only to
the stock portion of such transactions) out of a heterogeneous
complex of M&A transactions. Awkwardly, despite the intricacy,
variety, and evolving nature of M&A transactions, the literature is
consistent that this "chosen" group is not superior to other M&A
transactions from an efficiency perspective. Next, I demonstrate that
from this perspective the reorganization rules are largely irrelevant
even with respect to stock transactions.
2. Do tax rules drive M&A transactions?
From a business perspective, tax treatment has always been
considered an important factor in the list of possible motives for
M&A transactions. Although there is some evidence that tax benefits
could affect primary decisions, such as whether to enter into an
M&A transaction or not," 4 this evidence is not very significant." 5
Tax benefits are significant, nevertheless, in the decision of how
to execute an M&A transaction and particularly in the choice of
113. One unresolved situation is with respect to M&A transactions where stock is used
due to lack of cash or the significant costs of using it.
114. Hayn, supra note 64, at 148. This study examined a legal situation, prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, which was very different from the present and allowed easier exploitation
of reorganizations to achieve tax avoidance that is practically shut down at the present. See also
infra Appendix. Additionally, a major finding of Hayn's was that successful "reorganization"
increased the likelihood of completion of an M&A transaction. This finding may still be valid,
but it does not make tax a primary explanation for the initiation of M&A transactions. Id.
115. Analysis of a comprehensive 1968-1983 sample found that tax reduction was not a
significant motive for M&A transactions. Even when tax benefits had some value, it was far
lower than the overall premiums. Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, The Impact of Taxation
on Mergers and Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 69, 81 (1988); see also Martin
D. Ginsburg, Comment, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 366 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988). Romano further surveys later studies,
none of which provide support for a general tax-driven explanation for M&A transactions. See
Romano, supra note 91, at 135-36. Moreover, the same results could be achieved using
alternative techniques that are not inferior to reorganization preferences. See Ronald J. Gilson
et al., Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax Motivated
Acquisitions, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER
271 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988). But see Elliott J. Weiss, Comment, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 360 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et
al. eds., 1988). Doubting the conclusiveness of the results of Gilson and others, Weiss argued
that in the real world, it is not so easy to achieve the tax benefits that one may achieve in M&A
transactions in alternative ways, even if it is possible theoretically. Weiss rightly limits the
strength of the argument of Gilson and others, but not its validity. He also does not argue that
tax benefits are substantially driving M&A transactions.
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payment methods." 6 Once a decision to enter a specific transaction is
made and the business fundamentals are agreed upon, the parties will
try to minimize its tax implications. This typically leads to an attempt
to qualify the transaction as a reorganization in order to take
advantage of the tax deferral benefits of these rules." 7 This also
means that stock rather than cash will be used for payments.1 8 This
observation, which is obvious to anyone involved in these
transactions, is a very powerful criticism of the efficiency justification
for reorganizations, since it exposes the fact that such transactions
will be entered into with or without the tax subsidy that
reorganizations represent." 9  The subsidy embedded in the
reorganization provisions is therefore ineffective at best.
This is the next step in my analysis. It exposes the fact that even
the narrow interpretation of the efficiency properties of stock
transactions cannot support the preservation of the reorganization
rules. That is true even if it were clear that reorganizations (standing
alone) are wealth-creating transactions, since they would have taken
place (and created the same wealth) anyway. This is a classic case of
an ineffective subsidy. The only transactions the rules possibly
promote are the inherently inefficient, purely tax-driven transactions.
The large administrative, enforcement, and compliance costs are
therefore a pure waste. The actual effect of the reorganization
preferences is to provide a poorly designed, unfocused, and arbitrary
subsidy to some participants in certain forms of M&A transactions.
Who are these benefactors and what do they receive? This will be
discussed in Part III.C, but first I discuss some additional possible
efficiency aspects of reorganizations.
3. Do reorganizations correct a market failure?
Are there any other possible efficiency explanations for the
reorganization provisions? One explanation could be that they
116. This is well known. See Norris Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in
Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1183 (1957). A recent study showed that the tax
features of the acquiring corporation, rather than those of the target corporation, primarily
affect the transaction's structure. Merle Erickson, The Effect of Taxes on the Structure of
Corporate Acquisitions, 36 J. ACT. REs. 279, 296 (1998).
117. Sometimes it will be deemed a reorganization in order not to attract shareholders'
resistance. Obviously, they will be less likely to resist or further inquire into the transaction if it
does not result in their current taxation.
118. See Wansley et. al., supra note 64, at 19.
119. Therefore, these transactions cannot justify the subsidy. See Schizer, supra note 23.
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correct a market failure and optimize the amount and volume of
such transactions. There is no clear answer as to whether the use of
the market for corporate control is efficient, however. Nevertheless,
some recent studies provide powerful evidence of the central role and
comparative advantage of markets over management as efficient
means of restructuring industries. Holmstrom and Kaplan, in
particular, furthered the theory that capital markets are superior to
the corporate governance structure (primarily management) in
restructuring industries and allocating capital efficiently among
industries required to restructure as a result of deregulation and
technological changes (i.e., new information and communication
technologies). 2 ' Managers not only have misaligned motivations,
but also cannot respond as quickly, effectively, or appropriately to
changes.' 2' They conclude that a more market-oriented style of
corporate governance is probably here to stay, with the focus on
shareholder value, to which management has adapted and aligned its
own interests (through the new executive pay schemes). Holmstrom
and Kaplan's prediction is realistically reserved, since they
acknowledge that the market for corporate control is constantly
changing and that some of the effects may be temporary. Moreover,
they emphasize that M&A transactions, and M&A waves in
particular, are caused by a complex combination of factors.'22
There is ample evidence on market failures that may fit a
theoretical "corrective" efficiency explanation like the one
mentioned above. The problem is that there is no correlation
between such potential market failures and the operation of the
reorganization provisions. The opposite is true-these provisions are
more likely to facilitate market inefficiencies rather than mitigate
them. Information gaps, which allow management to abuse all other
120. BENGT HOLMSTROM & STEVEN N. KAPLAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
MERGER ACTIVITY IN THE U.S.: MAKING SENSE OF THE 1980S AND 1990s, at 2, 23-24, 28-29
(Mass. Inst. Tech. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 01-11, Feb. 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfin/SSRNID261112-code010221500.pdfabstractid=
261112.
121. It is interesting to compare this academic theory to the comment by John
Vogelstein, Comment, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 358 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988), who, as a practitioner, explained that
the pace of takeovers was very fast and the rational analysis in most transactions was either
limited or nonexistent. He believed that excesses in takeovers were brought about by
"speculation, ego, and greed." Id. at 359.
122. HOLMSTROM & KAPLAN, supra note 120, at 14. This insight seems trivial, but it
should always be kept in mind when one is to engineer policy relating to M&A transactions.
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players in this market, represent probably the single most significant
inefficiency potential. Selfish management maneuvers have proven to
be a valid, though partial, explanation for M&A transactions. These
maneuvers are also the only significant nonvalue-maximizing
explanation.
121
C. Motives for and Explanations of M&A Transactions
It should be clear at this point that the reorganization provisions
cannot be justified on efficiency grounds, but only a deeper look into
M&A transactions will expose the actual complication of the
efficiency analysis of these transactions and the inadequacy of their
tax treatment. In this subpart, I review the evidence from external
literature about M&A transactions and their efficiency properties. I
have two purposes for discussing the major findings of this literature
with respect to the validity of the theory regarding motives and
explanations in M&A transactions. My first purpose is to identify the
benefactors from the reorganization provisions and determine
whether the tax benefit they receive may be somehow justified. My
second purpose is to explore evidence that may be helpful in the next
subpart, where I test the correlation between the current
reorganization provisions and the efficiency properties of M&A
transactions.
1. The market for corporate control
The basic, naive outlook on M&A transactions is that there is a
market for corporate control that disciplines managers of
corporations with the threat of a takeover and loss of status if they
do not maximize their corporation's share value.' 24 Managers,
123. This is probably the right place to clear two additional "noises" from the system.
First, some may say this whole discussion is moot since reorganizations are utilized largely in a
related-party, or even a single-entity, context, so one should perhaps bifurcate the market
further to analyze each distinguishable context separately. This may be a good idea for further
study, but I have decided to focus here on the "mainstream" reorganizations, in order to make
this essay understandable to nontax-adept readers. This analysis would not look different even
if I did include all the relevant situations. However, I do not even have to prove this, since
there is further evidence that the general efficiency of M&A transactions in the long run is
independent of whether the combined corporations are related or not. See Romano, supra note
91, at 127. Second, as discussed already, the external literature provides evidence that tax
benefits in general do not drive M&A transactions; the benefits of the reorganization
provisions could not a fortiori be considered a major factor in the initiation of such
transactions. See supra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
124. Manne, supra note 79, at 111-13.
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therefore, have an incentive to be effective and maximize shareholder
wealth rather than serve their own interests. Nevertheless, the
managers-shareholders agency problem is not fully solved by the
market for corporate control since takeovers (especially if opposed by
managers) are costly. 2 ' Some studies even provide evidence that
takeovers are, in fact, motivated by managers' utility maximization
and therefore "are the paradigmatic agency problem, not its cure."'
26
Tension exists between the market-efficiency and agency-problem
explanations to the corporate phenomenon.
The standard view of M&A transactions has been challenged by
extensive studies. Unfortunately, even today few conclusions have
been drawn. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the empirical evidence
is consistent with the premise that M&A transactions generally
promote efficiency as wealth-creating transactions.127  These
transactions generate abnormal gains for the target corporation's
shareholders.' 28 There is no decisive evidence showing consistent
positive abnormal returns to the acquiring corporation's shareholders
after such a transaction.129 This result may seem strange, since the
acquiring corporation is supposedly the active initiator of the
transaction. One explanation for this is simply that management
enters M&A transactions with the purpose of maximizing its own
utility rather than its shareholders' wealth. 3 ° Another less skeptical
explanation is that M&A transactions do have the purpose of
shareholder wealth maximization, but for several reasons this
purpose is not reflected in the share price right after the M&A
announcement (in comparison with its pre-announcement price).
Most of the economic and business literature that explores the
consequences of M&A transactions consists of event studies of the
immediate postmerger share price changes. An alternative line of
125. FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAw 230 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993) [hereinafter
FOUNDATIONS].
126. Id. (referring to Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial
Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 125, at 241).
127. This part heavily relies on the excellent review by Professor Roberta Romano, supra
note 91, at 120.
128. This is more so the case in hostile takeovers. Michael C. Jensen & Richard S.
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983);
Jensen, supra note 78, at 314.
129. There is not even such evidence in the takeover context. Jensen, supra note 78, at
314.
130. Romano, supra note 91, at 123, 145-52.
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studies explores the long-term effects. These studies have found that
the average takeover destroys corporate value in the long run.131
Newer studies provide evidence of long-term performance
improvement after the merger,132 consistent with the findings that
M&A transactions are value creating and socially beneficial. 33 These
mixed results do not affect my analysis, since even under the more
optimistic results, it does not seem currently possible to extract
situations where M&A transactions are clearly desirable and pinpoint
the circumstances for the conclusion of such transactions. If there
were means to do that in a reliable manner, it might have been
possible to explore the weaknesses of the reorganization preferences
and possibly fix the rules to make them desirable. My conclusion,
however, is that the current data do not allow us any insights that
may encourage such a belief.
2. Efficiency explanations for M&A transactions
One set of explanations for M&A transactions assumes a value-
maximization motive behind the decision to enter into such
transactions. Professor Romano, in an important work in this field,
categorizes the various explanations of this kind into three types:
efficiency, expropriation, and market inefficiency.'34 In this Article, I
follow her classifications.
I begin with efficiency explanations for M&A transactions. The
first, and most straightforward, efficiency explanation for M&A
transactions is the hunt for synergy gains. Synergy gains are achieved
if the value of the reorganized (combined) firm is greater than that
of the reorganizing entities prior to the reorganization. One reason
for this greater value may be in more efficient operations
131. Sherry L. Jarrell, The Postmerger Performance of Corporate Takeovers (July 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reviewing this literature, referring to Jensen &
Ruback, supra note 128, and other studies from the 1980s).
132. Jarrell develops a methodology that compares the postmerger performance with the
projected performance absent the merger. It finds that the long-term performance is
significantly better than it would have been without the merger, justifying the perception of
mergers as socially beneficial in general. Her results show impaired performance in the first one
to two years postmerger, and a significant improvement in the next four to six years. Jarrell's
study covered sample takeovers from the years 1973-1985. !d.
133. Romano, supra note 91, at 125 (referring to a former draft of Jarrell, supra note
131). It is interesting to see that these findings are independent of whether the transaction is
between related or diverse firms. Jarrell, supra note 131, at 28. This finding challenges the
validity of the tax distinction between these types of transactions. See infra Part IV.
134. Romano, supra note 91, at 123.
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(operational synergy). 3 ' Recently, Maquieira and others'36 found
significant net synergistic gains even in nonconglomerate forms of
pure stock-for-stock mergers, reinforcing the reality that
conglomerate mergers are not wealth-creating. This increases doubts
about theories predicting that financial synergies motivate some
(primarily conglomerate) mergers.'37  On the other hand, it
strengthens the currently weak case for operating synergies in stock-
for-stock transactions (usually predicted in a nonconglomerate
form).' 38 An interesting aspect of this study is that it analyzed the
effect of M&A transactions on a variety of securities and stakeholders
and concluded that the wealth created in nonconglomerate stock-
for-stock mergers was shared by almost all classes of securities
holders. 39 To the extent security holders can affect M&A activity,
135. This efficiency results from a better match of management to resources in the post-
M&A firm. See id. at 126 n.20; see also Paolo Fulghieri & Laurie Simon Hodrick, Synergies
and Internal Agency Conflicts: The Double-Edged Sword of Mergers (May 2001)
(unpublished manuscript, draft on file with author) (developing this explanation in their study
of the effect of asset specificity on M&A activity). Another example of operational synergy
gains are simply economies of scale. Romano, supra note 91, at 126. The literature tracking
the 1980s M&A transactions found larger returns in M&A transactions with firms in related
businesses, and significant gains arose from the reallocation of assets of the acquired firms to
related acquirers. Id. In addition, Wansley and others found abnormal returns in M&A
transactions involving corporations with similar financial profiles. J. Wansley et al., Abnormal
Returns from Merger Profiles, 18 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 149, 160-61 (1983).
136. Carlos P. Maquicira et al., Wealth Creation Versus Wealth Redistribution in Pure
Stock-for-Stock Mergers, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1998). The sample used in this study consisted of
all publicly traded corporations involved in pure stock-for-stock mergers between January 1963
and March 1996.
137. Id. at 6, 16-18, 29.
138. Id.
139. Id. Surprisingly, they found significant wealth increases to convertible bondholders
in both forms and convertible preferred stockholders in nonconglomerate mergers. Even more
surprising is that often the acquiring corporation's convertible bondholders benefit more than
those of the target. Explanation of these findings awaits further study. A realistic observation
may be that convertible bondholders of the bidding corporation enjoy favorable conversion
terms, since they may include a large proportion of insiders and their "companions," which
generally suggests wealth redistribution motivations. Another study using a sample from a
similar period, though examining more than stock-for-stock transactions, similarly found
overall positive net wealth creation effect of M&A transactions. KEWEI HOU ET AL., DOES
TAKEOVER INCREASE STOCKHOLDER VALUE? (Eur. Fin. Ass'n, Working Paper No. 0488
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN-ID246151_code0011
01510.pdfabstractid=246151. They used a 1963-1995 sample and, similarly to Maquieira and
others, supra note 136, explored the overall effect on their sample as a "portfolio."
Additionally, they tried to combine short-term and long-term wealth creation results of
mergers. They found little difference between vertical and horizontal transactions. Further they
found that cash offers dramatically outperform stock offers, supporting, like Hou and others,
the management-disciplinary explanations of M&A transactions.
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and with respect solely to nonconglomerate transactions, this study
does not present results that discard the efficiency justification for
the reorganization provisions. 4 '
Another reason for the greater value found in the post-M&A
firm may be financial synergy, which reduces the cost of capital to
the firm. A reorganized firm should be able to more efficiently
redeploy its cash internally across divisions.' 4 ' As a by-product, the
tax motivation to retain earnings, rather than distribute them,
encourages the firm to use (the larger) retained earnings to internally
finance projects. This is significant because returns on internally
financed projects are lower than the marginal cost of capital were the
projects to be financed externally.'42 Second, the reorganized
corporation may be less exposed to bankruptcy, being potentially
more diversified.' 43 Finally, there may also be tax and accounting
benefits resulting from diversification." 4
A second efficiency explanation for M&A transactions is that
they reduce agency costs. This is the traditional, nalve view-that a
firm with inefficient management will be exposed to takeover by
another firm, whose more efficient management will increase the
value of the target unrealized by the failing management prior to the
140. I could not find support for another condition for this conclusion-that the tax
(deferral) benefit plays any role in the decision-making process of security holders. I do not
develop their role here, nor do I discuss the effects on shareholders who are also security
holders.
141. Romano, supra note 91, at 128.
142. Id.
143. Diversification, nevertheless, is not necessarily a value-maximizing motive, nor has it
proven to be, in general, a wealth-creating strategy. Id. at 128, 146-48. The basic idea is that,
apart from the special case of bank mergers, investors do not need M&A to diversify. They can
diversify themselves in a less costly manner. Diversification as a motive became most important
with the rise of conglomerates as a business model in the third M&A wave of the 1960s, which
has proven to be a failure. Nevertheless, in some deals, these diversifying transactions resulted
in notable successes, such as the GE story. See GAUGHAN, supra note 68, at 123-33.
144. See, e.g., GAUGHAN, supra note 68, at 154-58. The accounting benefits involved
primarily the use of the pooling method of accounting, which has been limited over the years,
cannot represent a real efficiency gain, and is similar to tax-motivated M&A transactions. See
Romano, supra note 91, at 127. Studies showed, nevertheless, that the market could discern
accounting gains from real economic gains, and, in reality, such accounting synergy gains do
not motivate takeovers. Id. at 128 & n.28 (referring to Hai Hong et al., Pooling v. Purchase:
The Effects of Accounting for Mergers on Stock Prices, 53 ACCT. REv. 31 (1978)). New
accounting rules eliminated pooling transactions at the end of 2000, but the data proves that,
in fact, pooling transactions did not generally result in higher accounting gains than purchase
transactions. See Flom, supra note 82, at 769-70.
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takeover. 4 ' This way, the market for corporate control keeps the
capital market competitive.'46 Some studies support this outlook and
even its application to nonhostile cases where efficiencies have been
evidenced postmerger without indication of operation synergy gains,
leading Romano to attribute them to better management.'47 In any
event, this explanation does not apply to cases in which the
incumbent management is retained by the acquirer. 148  Finally,
management-supported buyouts may also be explained by the mere
fact that after the transaction management becomes a larger
shareholder.
49
3. Expropriation explanations for M&A transactions
The expropriation explanations assume that M&A transactions
do not create new wealth, but rather redistribute wealth from one
sector of the economy to another. Most of the discussion has been
over whether they transfer wealth from shareholders to bondholders
(or stakeholders in general) or vice versa.' The most typical of these
explanations concentrates on the potential tax benefits of takeovers,
145. Romano, supra note 91, at 129 (referring to the classical Manne, supra note 79).
146. Note that this rationale is not relevant to mergers, management-friendly
acquisitions, or single-entity/single -group reorganizations.
147. Romano, supra note 91, at 130.
148. Jensen provided an agency cost reduction explanation to takeovers even in these
circumstances in his "free cash flow" theory. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323 (1986). Free cash flow is the excess
of cash over the corporation's need for projects generating positive net present value returns.
Shareholders would like it to be distributed, but management's interest is to retain it under
their control. For various reasons, management wants to expand the firm beyond the size that
maximizes shareholders' wealth and stay away from the supervision of the capital markets.
Takeovers eliminate such free cash flow, but keep the power of this cash in the hands of
management in the form of the acquired target. Managers will do that even if the expected
returns are low or negative, since their alternative is to distribute the cash and completely lose
control over it. This theory also explains the high returns to target shareholders versus low
returns to the acquiring corporation's shareholders. Interestingly, if and when this theory
applies, we expect cash to be the major, if not the sole, consideration. These transactions,
therefore, should generally not benefit from tax advantages.
149. The buyout also has an obvious greater incentive to enhance productivity, blurring
the agency problem by mixing in the interests of management as shareholders. See Romano,
supra note 91, at 133. This explanation has limited application-it applies to management-
supported buyouts only.
150. New research, nevertheless, widened the scope to include more specific groups,
distinguishing between different stakeholders, to make the incentive picture even more
convoluted. See Maquieira et al., supra note 136.
which I discuss separately below.'' A nontax explanation of this type
focuses on leveraged buyouts (LBOs), claiming that they are
designed to expropriate wealth from the corporation's
bondholders.5 2 This explanation, however, is not supported by
sufficient convincing evidence-bondholders' losses were too small
compared to shareholders' gains in takeovers.5 3 A more interesting
expropriation explanation focusing on especially hostile takeovers has
been that they are designed to expropriate wealth from employees.
The argument is that a takeover is an attractive event for
shareholders, since it allows them to behave opportunistically and
earn abnormal returns knowing that the bidder will have less
commitment to the corporation's employees.5 4 This explanation is
not currently believed to be powerful enough to motivate takeovers,
a fortiori other M&A transactions. Finally, it has been argued that
M&A transactions increase market power and allow the combined
corporation to attain greater (monopolistic) income from rents,
expropriating wealth from consumers. This explanation related
mainly to the first M&A waves and diminished as antitrust law
developed. 5 In many cases, M&A transactions involve unrelated
businesses, where this explanation is even less relevant."5 6 In
151. See supra Part III.B.2.
152. A more leveraged corporation is a riskier investment, but the bondholders are
typically not compensated for this change in their risk position in advance. In effect, such
transactions redistribute wealth from the bondholders to the shareholders, Romano, supra
note 91, at 136-37, and, potentially, to management.
153. Id. at 137. Moreover, LBOs were used mainly in the fourth M&A wave, but have
declined in importance since, and seem not to be of further concern at the present. No new
study provides evidence that changes the conclusion that this explanation is not a significant
motive to enter M&A transactions.
154. Shleifer and Summers, supra note 83, at 53, have developed this "breach of trust"
explanation, arguing that there is an implicit contract between the employees and their
management and shareholders. This contract, a long-term commitment to the employees,
cannot be easily breached. A takeover is one event where it could, since the bidder has no part
in this contract. In that event, therefore, shareholders can "walk away" with (at least a share of)
the value that this contract represents-a value that would have belonged, otherwise, to the
employees, without any further consequences. This explanation was criticized both for the use
of the "implicit contract" terminology and for its validity. Romano, supra note 91, at 139. For
my purposes it is enough to mention two arguments: first, in cases where an explicit contract
could have been used, the employees chose not to use it, and therefore, had always had the
conscientious risk of forfeiture; second, it is hard to find persuasive identification of specific
value that could have been subject to such a contract. There is no empirical evidence
significantly supporting it either. Id. at 140-42.
155. Romano, supranote 91, at 142.
156. Additionally, there is no convincing empirical evidence supporting this explanation.
Jensen, supra note 78; see also Romano, supra note 91, at 142-43.
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conclusion, expropriation explanations of M&A transactions are not
convincingly supported by empirical study and are therefore
generally irrelevant to my project.
4. Market inefficiencies as a driver of M&A transactions
Market inefficiency explanations assume unequal information in
the market for corporate control, such as in situations where the
buyer identifies an undervalued target (a corporation worth more
than its aggregate stock value) and raids it by paying a premium to
its shareholders. This premium has been proven to be lower than the
real value of such stock. This straightforward, but unsupportable,"5 7
version explains target undervaluation as due to simple pricing
errors. A more sophisticated explanation argues that investors
overvalue short-term profits and undervalue long-term profits, and
therefore firms that heavily invest in long-term planning and R&D
are generally undervalued by the market and more exposed to
takeovers." 8 Managers who identify this phenomenon will also tend
to behave inefficiently and shift resources from long-term projects to
short-term projects.5 9 This myopic behavior is observed in the
market, but not to the effect of initiating takeovers or other M&A
transactions. Therefore these studies are also not relevant to my
proposal. 6 °
5. M&A transactions driven by management interests or incapabilities
There is an important group of explanations that do not assume
value-maximizing motives behind these transactions, but rather
management-interest maximization. Managers seek to increase their
power and wealth, a phenomenon commonly called empire-
157. A worthy line of future study could be to reevaluate this conclusion in light of the
high-tech frenzy of the late 1990s.
158. Romano, supra note 91, at 144.
159. Since this behavior was not found to be material in actually driving M&A
transactions, and, even if it was found to be material, I believe that it would not be realistic to
base legal rules on such abstract myopic behavior, especially when we do not sufficiently
understand it and are not capable of measuring it. In a sense, this explanation is also an
efficiency-enhancing explanation and an expropriation explanation in that it redistributes
wealth (what is this unknown item that is redistributed?) from the future to the present. Id. at
144-45.
160. Even assuming that this phenomenon is real, we obviously do not want to support it
with a tax subsidy.
building. 61 This explanation is supported by several empirical
studies, 62 and is at least a partial factor behind M&A transactions. 61
A similar explanation focuses on the risk, rather than the upside, to
management. M&A transactions provide management with an
opportunity to diversify their business; diversification may reduce the
risk of bankruptcy, increase debt capacity, and reduce operational
risks. 164 Except for special cases, 16 this is not very helpful or attractive
to investors, who can diversify their holdings more cheaply at the
portfolio level. 166 Managers, whose eggs are in one basket (of the
specific firm), may very well benefit from diversification at the
corporation level, even at the expense of their shareholders. 67
Diversification, in general, found little support as an important
explanation for M&A transactions in the literature.' 61
Richard Roll argued that although managers do try to make
value-maximizing acquisitions, they fail to correctly value their
targets. 69 Therefore, they generally pay too much and refuse to
admit their mistake even after the bid has commenced and share
prices have fallen. Thus, takeovers result in wealth transfers from the
acquiring corporation's shareholders to the target's shareholders.
This hubris theory is only partially supported by empirical evidence
and, at any rate, cannot completely explain the M&A phenomenon,
since the evidence shows that takeovers result in efficiency gains, not
only in wealth transfers. 7 ' Moreover, bidders should have learned
from this experience, or at least should have been advised on it, and
therefore this explanation may only have validity, if at all, in minor
cases or with respect to first-time, ill-advised bidders. In contrast,
161. Romano, supra note 91, at 148.
162. Id. at 148-49.
163. A variant of this explanation uses Jensen's "free cash" theory, supra note 148, which
is partially supported by some studies. Romano, supra note 91, at 149-50.
164. Romano, supra note 91, at 146.
165. Bank mergers are one example. See id.
166. This is the case, as already demonstrated, from the shareholder's point of view. Id.
167. Id. at 147-48. Romano adds a value-maximizing variant to this explanation, stating
that possibly the managers' ability to diversify allows the shareholders to reduce their
compensation, so both sides are better off. This efficiency "spin," nevertheless, is not
supported empirically.
168. Id.
169. Managers may also fail to correctly evaluate their own ability to turn the failing
acquisition around. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197
(1986).
170. See Romano, supra note 91, at 151-52; Wansley et al., supra note 97, at 412.
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Shleifer and Vishny argue that management acts rationally,
expecting, identifying, and reacting to stock market inefficiencies
that result in incorrect valuation of the stock involved in the
transaction.'71
In a recent study, Rau and Vermaelen introduced an angle that
further complicates the picture. 172  They discovered differences
between "glamour firms" (corporations with low book-to-market
ratios-a positive measurement for management performance) and
other firms. In support of the hypothesis that markets over-
extrapolate the past performance of the bidder when assessing the
value of acquisitions, the researchers found that glamour firms'
managers overestimate their abilities to manage a target corporation.
They attribute this phenomenon to management hubris. 173 On the
other hand, the managers at "value firms" (those with bad past
performance) are much more restricted by internal disciplinary
means. The restrictions better assure that M&A transactions are
motivated by shareholder value creation and not by management
hubris. The conclusion is that the market fails to understand that
past managerial performance is not a good indicator of future
performance, at least in the case of acquisitions. 174 This failure does
explain why we identify short-term positive returns upon M&A
transactions, followed by long-term underperformance. Nevertheless,
not all of the glamour managers are interested in short-term gains, so
the original puzzle is not solved. 7  The distinction between glamour
171. ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, STOCK MARKET DRIVEN ACQUISITIONS
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8439, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/delivery.cfim/SSRN-ID278563code0l 1004600.pdfabstractid=
278563.
172. P. Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen, Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition
Performance ofAcquiring Firms, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1998).
173. Id. at 225, 251. For Roll's management hubris explanation, see supra note 169.
174. Rau & Vermaelen, supra note 172, at 251.
175. Another interesting distinction Rau and Vermaelen make is between mergers and
tender offers, which are used interchangeably in some of the literature I survey here. They
found significantly lower returns in mergers compared to tender offers, both in "glamour" and
"value" firms. Id. at 227. For similar results, see T. Loughran & A. Vijh, Do Long-Term
Shareholders Benefit From Corporate Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1789 (1997). This finding
is not new and can be easily associated with the other literature on the different returns of
different means of payments, documenting consistently higher returns in cash payments than in
stock transactions, which are more typical in mergers. The authors also add that many of their
results are also consistent with the means of payment hypothesis just described. Id.; see also
Wansley et al., supra note 97 (supporting the payment method signaling hypothesis). It is
possible to argue that glamour firms time their (stock) payments with overvaluation of their
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and value firms, and the different processes they experience in M&A
transactions, is also ignored by tax law, which is generally not
sensitive to inefficient and socially undesirable "managerialism."
Management-related explanations are not convincingly
supported by empirical studies. Nonetheless, transactions actually
driven by such motivations are likely to be inefficient, since
maximizing shareholders' wealth is not in the interest of managers.
For the same reason, these transactions are also most likely to be
manipulated to maximize their tax benefits and are more likely to be
stock rather than cash transactions.
6. The importance of deregulation
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford provide another perspective on
M&A transactions, emphasizing the important role of industry
shocks on the volume of M&A activity in the specific industry. 76
The identification of industry shocks as a factor in the evolution of
merger waves has been recognized for some thirty years, but only
recently have studies provided evidence successfully tying mergers to
specific industry shocks.177 It is well known that mergers cluster not
only in waves but also by industries. It is also apparent now that the
various motives that have been proven relevant to M&A transactions
are not always relevant. In particular, Andrade and others provide
evidence of one significant industry shock that has affected several
industries-deregulation, which, they conclude, accounts for nearly
half of M&A activity since the late 1980s (the fifth merger wave). 178
firm's stock. Rau & Vermaelen, supra note 172, at 251; see also Loughran & Vijh, supra. An
earlier study by Henri Servaes found evidence showing that more value can be created from
taking over poorly performing companies, consistent with the simple story of the market for
corporate control. Henri Servaes, Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers, 46 J. FIN. 409
(1991). This is somewhat in contrast to Rau and Vermaelen, but the evidence relates to an
earlier sample. Moreover, the validity of its methodology is questionable as well.
176. GREGOR ANDRADE ET AL., NEW EVIDENCE AND PERSPECTIVES ON MERGERS
(Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 01-070, 2001), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID269313_codeO10523500.pdfabstractid=269313.
177. See id. at 6 n.7.
178. In their words: "[W]e can say without exaggeration or hyperbole that in explaining
the causes of mergers and acquisitions, the 1990s were the 'decade of deregulation."' Id. at 3.
I note that they used a 1973-1998 sample. One other current important article in the field of
M&A transactions also emphasizes the role of deregulation in the merger wave of the 1990s,
together with new information and communication technologies. See HOLMSTROM &
KAPLAN, supra note 120, at 2. Their empirical evidence corresponds to that of ANDRADE ET
AL., supra note 176.
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Interestingly, the abnormal returns to target shareholders are
consistent throughout the years in spite of the differences between
the waves and industries involved.
It is also clear that the shareholders of the acquiring corporation
do not similarly benefit from participation in M&A transactions. It
cannot be conclusively determined that they lose wealth in these
transactions, but even if they benefit from them, the benefit is
relatively small. Interestingly, Andrade and others conclude that it is
important to separate stock-financed M&A transactions from other
transactions in order to accurately evaluate their effect, since these
transactions inherently embed an equity issue that normally bids
down the stock price.' 79 After this separation, they conclude that, in
line with other studies that I have elaborated on, stock-financed
mergers do not increase overall shareholder value in the short term.
The long-term analysis, imprecise as it is,18° makes it even worse for
stock-financed transactions, which suffer negative abnormal returns
relative to cash-financed mergers. 8 ' This study seriously challenges
the efficiency of the tax subsidy that we grant to such stock
transactions. An interesting question is whether we can apply the tax
subsidy exclusively to restructuring industries where efficiency
benefits and nontax motivations are more likely to drive M&A
activity. Of course, even if we could, this would probably be an
ineffective and still-inefficient subsidy since it is reasonable to argue
that these transactions will most likely take place anyway.
7. The effect of asset specificity on M&A activity
Another important factor in the initiation of M&A transactions,
which has been explored in a recent study, is the degree of asset
specificity in the involved firms or industries, i.e., the excess value of
an asset in the relevant firm in comparison with its value in an
alternative use. 82 Fulghieri and Hodrick found that the performance
of diversifying mergers improves as their degree of asset specificity
179. ANDRADE ETAL., supra note 176, at 10.
180. Id. at 12-13.
181. This is an interesting result; nevertheless, the methodological soundness and its
importance are still in doubt. Andrade and others, supra note 176, reasonably chose to
mention it without allowing it to affect their conclusions.
182. Fulghieri & Hodrick, supra note 135.
increases.' 83 The intuition they prove is that in merging firms with a
high degree of asset specificity there is a smaller chance that internal
battles will change operational assignments for the worse, generating
negative internal agency effects that are more likely to occur in M&A
transactions between firms with a low degree of asset specificity.
Their findings prove that the positive synergy effects of mergers
outweigh these potential negative internal agency effects if they are
particularly large, or, when they are only moderate, in firms with
high degrees of asset specificity. These results can be generalized and
help explain the concentration of M&A activity by industries. 1
84
8. Conclusion: the material motivations and explanations of M&A
transactions
The classic external literature' supports mainly the synergy
gains and the agency cost-reduction explanations of M&A
transactions, complemented by some management-driven
explanations.' 86 No single explanation has sufficiently powerful
empirical support or has been proven to apply equally to all
transactions. 187 Recent literature reinforces these results and adds
insight on the importance of additional factors. The more important
additional factors include industry shocks, in general, and
deregulation in certain industries, in particular. Asset specificity is
also helpful, in explaining the concentration of M&A transactions by
industries. This complexity and multiplicity of relevant factors
exposes further the inadequacy of the stable, but crude and
unsophisticated, tax rules that apply to these transactions.
183. Id. (comparing the consistency of their results with an earlier study, Randall Morck
& Bernard Yeung, Why Firms Diversify: Internalization vs. Agency Behavior, in INTANGIBLE
ASSETS: VALUES, MEASURES, AND RISKS 269 (John Hand & Baruch Lev eds., 2003), available
at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-byeung/firms.pdf.
184. Fulghieri and Hodrick also predict that in mergers of corporations with high degrees
of asset specificity, equity financing is more likely than debt financing since debt is an
established mechanism to control internal agency costs (restriction and control over
management) and is less necessary in such cases where it is controlled by the asset composition
of the merging firms. This prediction has, nevertheless, yet to be substantiated. See Fulghieri &
Hodrick, supra note 135.
185. See Romano, supra note 91, at 123-24, for additional theories that I chose to
preclude from this review.
186. Id. at 152-53.
187. Id.
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I now take the next step and review the lack of correlation
between the major components of the current tax regime and the
efficiency-enhancing features of M&A transactions.
D. No Correlation Between the Tax Laws and the
Efficiency Features of M&A Transactions
A primary feature of the reorganization provisions is their
application solely to stock compensation. My analysis up to this point
has demonstrated that the available economic and finance studies
could not support an assertion that the transactions qualifying as
reorganizations, standing alone, are wealth-creating overall. From an
efficiency perspective, the pro-stock bias of these rules is, at best,
questionable. In fact, tax distortions themselves contribute to the
relative inefficiency of such transactions, especially when compared
to all M&A transactions. Another interesting result of the above
review is that the big winners in M&A transactions in general are the
target shareholders, and, potentially, the managers involved in the
transaction. The main effect of the reorganization preferences is to
subsidize exactly the same population-target shareholders-since
they are the only ones that may defer current taxation. The necessity
of this subsidy to target shareholders is questionable in this light, but
beyond my scope here. 8'
A second major feature of the reorganization preferences is the
requirement of business continuity. This requirement is satisfied by
the continuity of either the historical business or its assets. 89 From a
business perspective, these two alternative requirements are
significantly different. The first may mean that intra-industry
transactions may qualify as reorganizations, but it also means that
vertical and conglomerate transactions are acceptable as long as the
original business is maintained. From an efficiency standpoint,
therefore, this requirement is not very useful. It may even be
harmful, since it also supports the currently undesirable
conglomerate transactions and may discourage more efficient
reallocations of business assets across industries. The other prong of
this requirement mandates that the bulk of the historical business
assets are transferred together, i.e., not necessarily each asset
188. The subsidy raises fairness questions in addition to efficiency issues relating to
managerialism and the wasteful costs-of-agency problems supposedly encouraged by these
provisions.
189. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (as amended in 2001).
separately to its value-maximizing target. A relevant aspect explored
in the literature is the importance of asset specificity as an indicator
for potentially desirable M&A transactions. 9° This finding relaxes
the above-mentioned effect of the second requirement, since in
transactions involving firms with high levels of asset specificity this
happens naturally. It is hard to weigh these conflicting potential
effects without further study, but in general the business-continuity
alternative requirements do not seem to make sense from an
efficiency standpoint. The business-continuity requirement is written
in a way that ignores much of the available business knowledge
about the transactions to which it applies. For example, it ignores the
distinctions found between different industry types and their
importance in determining some of the economic consequences of
these transactions.
The third and historically most important reorganization
requirement is that of target shareholder continuity, basically
mandating that a substantial portion of the target shareholders is
subjected to the risk of owning the acquiring corporation's stock
immediately after the transaction. This requirement only applies to
the result immediately after the transaction; target shareholders can
dispose of such stock shortly after the transaction.19' However, they
are subject to the price fluctuations of the acquiring corporation's
stock in the immediate short term. The effects of this requirement
are interesting: it subjects the target shareholders, the clear winners
in M&A transactions, to either negative or only slightly positive
returns for at least a short period of time. Their enrichment is
therefore mitigated and potentially replaced by tax deferral
advantages. There is no requirement that target shareholders have
any influence, much less control, in the surviving entity. A
reorganization therefore has the potential to enhance, rather than
reduce, the costs of agency problems within the participating firms in
M&A transactions.' 92 Otherwise, this central requirement has no
efficiency-enhancing effects.
The business purpose requirement does not necessarily target
specific purposes. Rather, it requires "a" business purpose. From an
190. Fulghieri & Hodrick, supra note 135.
191. For the minimum holding period requirement, see BITKER & EUSTICE, supra note
8, 12.21[5].
192. This enhancement of problems occurs because reorganizations necessarily dilute
ownership.
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efficiency perspective, motives are not important. They are,
nevertheless, indirectly relevant, since management entrenchment
and self-promotion likely result in inefficient consequences. This
requirement is interesting since it at least has the potential to be
utilized to promote certain transactions that we can identify as not
inefficient and therefore mitigate some negative consequences of
reorganizations."'
We see therefore that there is no correlation between any of the
major components of the reorganization rules and the efficiency
properties of M&A transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION-FULL TAXATION OF REORGANIZATIONS
My analysis shows that neither of the possible justifications I
extracted from the legislative history and policy debate could
sufficiently and sensibly support the preferential reorganization tax
regime. First, the reorganization regime, as an exception to the
realization requirement, cannot be justified by the standard rationale
for the prevalence of this requirement in the income tax system-
valuation and liquidity concerns. Neither can it be supported on
efficiency grounds, as I demonstrated in Part III, which is the
primary contribution of this Article. Second, the reorganization
regime cannot be justified on the grounds that it is a desirable
subsidy, or even a subsidy with some desirable properties, such as
credibility.194 It is ineffective and counterproductive as a subsidy to
transactions that would have taken place regardless of the subsidy.
Moreover, it is a poorly directed subsidy. Third, although not
directly discussed at length in this Article, this regime likely has
undesirable fairness consequences that benefit the upper class. 91 The
conclusion is that the reorganization preferences are a costly and
wasteful piece of legislation. The complexity of the rules and the
constantly changing variety of M&A transactions (and explanations
193. I would reject this possibility since it also has the potential to be politically abused to
promote only inefficient transactions. Our politicians' track record in adjusting the tax law to
accommodate available economic evidence is poor, which is apparent from my discussion in
this section and the multiplicity of the notorious "loopholes" in the tax system.
194. Schizer, supra note 23.
195. See, e.g., Ip, supra note 24, at D2. The fairness angle is also much wider and applies
to incentives to capital income earners (mainly the rich) in general. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler,
Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor
Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REv. 325, 386, 388 (2002); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax
Shelters, 55 TAx L. REv. 215 (2002).
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for them) illuminate how crude and untargeted these provisions are,
even though they have remained intact for eighty years, completely
detached from the market reality.
In light of the lack of any substantively sensible reason to support
the current reorganization regime, I am compelled to propose to
completely eliminate it and tax all M&A transactions as they occur.'96
I understand that this is a difficult proposition to most experienced
tax professionals, who generally prefer a familiar villain over an
unknown one. I understand this approach and can partially attribute
to it the impressive stability of these rules in the system. 197 However,
I must reject it in this case, since taxing reorganizations is not a
replacement, new, or unknown regime and since there is simply no
clearly desirable feature in the current regime. The question is not of
balance, since there is no material benefit in keeping the current
regime rather than repealing it.
Professor Shakow proposed to do away with this preferential
scheme in 1990 with respect to all corporate acquisitions (not only
reorganizations) 98  following an ALI proposal to make the
reorganizations subsidy elective, 99 adding that such action will
require major changes in the tax law.2"' The primary reason for his
(and the ALI's) proposal was simplicity. Shakow was concerned, for
example, with the fact that even in a taxable merger only the
shareholders of the disappearing entity may be taxed. The surviving
entity's shareholders are never taxed in a realization-based system.
196. I do not attempt here to make a normative statement on other transactions, such as
"internal reorganizations," although I have included some data on such transactions, which
does not always expose significant differences between those transactions and the acquisitive
reorganizations dealt with in this Article. Interestingly, the Code deals with these transactions
sporadically, through § 368, as well as the consolidated returns rules. It is possible that the
original purpose of reorganizations was to accommodate exactly these transactions, but they
clearly did not evolve that way.
197. The other reason is political, namely, self-interest of all the decision makers.
198. David J. Shakow, Wither, 'C'!, 45 TAx L. REv. 177 (1990). Another proposal,
raised by Professor Coven, was to make all corporate acquisitions tax-free. Coven, supra note
10. Coven's proposal aims at other distortions of the income tax system, like the realization
requirement and corporate tax. I assume these two are unlikely to change. So long as these do
not change, Coven's proposal would result in a more distortive acquisition-driven economy.
See also Shakow's more specific criticism, supra, at 208-12.
199. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C 22-312 (1982);
see also Shakow, supra note 198, at 178. Shakow rightfully criticized the "fatalistic" approach
of the ALI, but acknowledged that not allowing the election must result in the major changes
he proposes to the tax law. Id. at 179.
200. Shakow, supra note 198, at 179, 193.
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This may not be a serious path of tax avoidance in reality, but we do
have fairly effective tools in the code to restrain it, such as those
presented by Shakow himself. One such tool may be to always treat
the larger entity as the surviving entity. This rule may be extended to
reorganizations without significant costs.
I agree with Shakow's general approach, but in this Article I
propose a more modest, limited, and less complicated proposal that
does not require significant changes in the tax law. Reforming the
taxation of all M&A transactions is complicated and, even under
Shakow's sensible proposal, involves certain material policy
uncertainties and risks. The repeal of the reorganization provisions
alone may not be a complete reform-it is just a first step-but it is
an inherently risk-free, efficient simplification step with no
potentially undesirable effects. 201
201. Shakow's other major concern was the equalization of treatment of transactions
involving partnerships. In this regard, I think that it is not necessary to equalize their treatment
to that of corporations. Two corporations could, indeed, form a partnership, rather than a
corporation, tax free. They will not, nevertheless, avoid at least one level of corporate tax. They
may avoid a second level of corporate tax, but that is not very disturbing since they could do
that anyway under the current regime using an LLC, a "checked-the-box" entity, etc., or just
by utilizing a dividend-received deduction. Id. at 205-06.
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Appendix: History and Evolution
I. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND2 3
The corporate income tax was the first enacted income tax in
America.2"4 The Income Tax Act of 1894 attempted to tax corporate
income, but was invalidated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust C0.20 1 on the ground that such tax
was a direct tax on income from real estate and personal property,
not apportioned among the states in proportion to population as
required by Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution.20 6
Congress learned its lesson, and in 1909207 it successfully enacted a
corporate income tax based on the business activity of corporations
rather than on their property. 0 8 This tax was validated just two years
later by the Supreme Court's decision in Flint v. Stone Trace C0.20 9
The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment and the individual
income tax followed in 1913.
The basic foundations of the income tax treatment of corporate
structural changes were established in the Revenue Act of 1918,210
following earlier Treasury rulings that no taxable income resulted
from the exchange of property or stock for stock.2" In addition to
these rulings, the Act was instituted to settle the confusion created
by several seminal cases on point, which took place prior to the 1918
Act. In Unites States v. Phellis,212 the Supreme Court denied
nonrecognition to a transfer of assets from a New Jersey corporation
to a Delaware corporation, based on the theory of "separation "-a
202. This section includes a historical review. It is intended to provide background of the
tax code for the reader.
203. For a more comprehensive historical review, see Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate
Reorganizations: Purging Penelope's Web, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1335 (1985).
204. This statement disregards the ancillary income tax that was enacted to fund the Civil
War and was repealed in 1872. See http://vwvw.irs.gov/irs/article/O,,id=98142,00.html.
205. 158 U.S. 601, vacating 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
206. See BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 8, 1.01.
207. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 28, 36 Stat. 92 (repealed 1913).
208. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 8, 1.01.
209. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
210. The Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917 contained no such provisions.
211. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 8 (3d ser. 1940).
212. 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
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severance of value from the original equity investment of something
of value "for [the] separate use, benefit and disposal" of the
taxpayer 213-- distinguishing it from Eisner v. Macomber.24 The Court
mentioned the fact that the new corporation had been organized in a
different state, but in another decision it ignored this argument.215 A
few years later it affirmed the rule,216 which has been settled ever
since, that this fact is meaningless. 217 Finally, in Weiss v. Stearn, the
taxpayer won, and the Supreme Court applied its intuition that
imposition of tax requires something more than a mere change in
technical ownership, allowing even some cashing out as long as that
did not affect the nature of the unsold portion. 18 As asserted by
Professor Paul, "It would be a masterpiece of understatement to call
the net result of the[se] cases ... far from satisfactory .... Logic was
having a fling at the expense of practical values in a world of
metaphysics .... The result was complete confusion."" 9 Apparently,
the courts failed to make coherent law in this case, and the
legislature had to step in. It is doubtful, however, if that has changed
things for the better.22°
This unclear legal background leading to the 1918 legislation
was amplified by the high tax rates of that period, which created
increased pressure by industry on the government to provide
adequate guidance on the subject.221 The result was the enactment of
Section 202(b), providing nonrecognition treatment for exchanges
213. PAUL, supra note 211, at 11 (emphasis omitted).
214. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Eisner v. Macomber is the leading case for nonrecognition
treatment. The Supreme Court denied taxation upon the distribution of a stock dividend,
which was held to be a mere capitalization of the profits of the distributing corporation, and
not something that the shareholder had received out of the corporation's assets for his separate
use and benefit.
215. Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921), was decided similarly and on the
same date as Phellis, but the sole difference in circumstances was that the new corporation had
been organized in the same state. See PAUL, supra note 211, at 13.
216. The reasoning first appeared in a separate opinion in Marr v. U.S., 268 U.S. 536,
542 (1925); see also PAUL, supra note 211, at 13.
217. The insignificant nature of the state of organization was later codified into the type
"F" reorganization.
218. 265 U.S. 242 (1924); see PAUL, supra note 211, at 15-16.
219. PAUL, supra note 211, at 18.
220. As asserted by Posin, supra note 203, at 1347, "Since the Court had apparently
dropped the ball, it seemed appropriate for Congress to step in and pick it up. Congress did so,
but then proceeded to fumble it. In retrospect it might have been better to let the Court
continue to grapple with the problem."
221. PAUL, supra note 211, at 9.
of property "in connection with the reorganization, merger, or
consolidation of a corporation." '222 The rule adopted was that if, in
connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a
corporation, a shareholder exchanges her stock or securities for other
stock or securities "of no greater aggregate par or face value, 2 such
shareholder will have recognized no gain or loss on the exchange.
The stock or securities she receives will be treated as taking the place
of those exchanged. A property owner exchanging such property
with stock or securities in a corporation to which she has transferred
her property was also granted the same treatment. Any par or face
value (not fair market value) received in excess of the stock,
securities, or property exchanged was treated as gain. These
situations are, basically, the "stock-for-stock" and "stock-for-
property" reorganizations as we know them today. Merger and
consolidation transactions were also covered in the "stock-for-
property" rule. 224  The legislative history indicates that such
transactions were viewed at the time by the legislators as "purely
paper transactions., 225 The Senate attempted to pass an even wider
version of the nonrecognition treatment, but was stopped by the
House.226
The 1921 Act, enacted in a more accommodating political and
economic environment, attempted to provide better and more
elaborate guidance on the basic rules for determining gains and
losses on corporate transactions. The relevant code section remained
Section 202, though now Subsection 202(c) treated exchanges of
properties. The new general gain-recognition rule also created a new
term-"readily realizable market value., 22 7 Subsection 202(c)(2) was
222. I.R.C. § 202(b) (1918), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx LAWS: 1938-1861, at 898 (1938).
223. Id.
224. No definition of a reorganization was legislated, and the legislation did not cover all
of the situations raised in prior case law. A definition did appear later, in Treas. Reg., 45 art.
1567 (as amended in 1921). Interestingly, in Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481
(1937), the Commissioner argued that the 1918 Act had not exempted property- for-stock
transactions (only stock-for- stock), in contrast to the regulation. The substantive argument was
that merely formal changes are covered by the nonrecognition provision. The Supreme Court
refused to look into the substance of this argument and accepted the Treasury Regulation as a
correct interpretation of the statute. PAUL, supra note 211, at 19-21.
225. S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 899.
226. H.R. REP. No. 65-1037, at 44-45 (1918), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222,
at 899.
227. I.R.C. §202(c) (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 789-90.
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positioned as an exception to the rule's general requirement that
there be recognition of the gain or loss realized in a transaction228 if
property received by a taxpayer in an exchange had such value. The
exception applied if the exchange of property was part of a
"reorganization." A "reorganization," therefore, was statutorily
defined for the first time to include a merger, a consolidation, a
stock-for-stock acquisition, a stock-for-assets acquisition,229  a
recapitalization, and a mere change in a corporation's identity, form,
or place of organization. 230 Here we can see the establishment of the
reorganization concept in a readily recognizable structure similar to
Section 368 patterns.23'
Moreover, Subsection 202(c)(2) also added another basic pillar
in the reorganizations tax law. The "substantially all" concept
212
requires only a majority of both vote and value in the target
corporation for the reorganization exception to apply. Prior to this
law, supposedly, there was no leeway, and a transfer of all the stock
of the target corporation was strictly required in order for taxpayers
to realize the benefits of corporate nonrecognition. 233 The purpose
of the new rule was to clarify the treatment of corporate structural
228. Practically, the wording of this rule reversed the presumption under prior law that
every exchange of properties is taxed unless it falls in the exception. As a result, the
presumption became no taxation unless there is a readily realizable market value to the
property exchanged. The reversal of this presumption was a result of excessive uncertainty and
litigation under prior law. See H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 10 (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN,
supra note 222, at 790.
229. The Senate Finance Committee Report adds, in this respect, that reorganization was
meant to cover transfers of productive assets used in a trade or business for like-kind property.
Similar lines of thought may influence the current continuity of the business enterprise
requirement. See S. REP. No. 67-275, at 12 (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
791. Additionally, see the discussion in the Senate. 61 CONG. REC. 6,561-66 (1921),
reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 792-96. The discussion in the Senate added another
conceptual requirement not yet formalized but familiar to us today-the business purpose
requirement. Id.
230. The last two, which we recognize today as type "E" and "F" reorganizations, were
introduced in the 1921 Act for the first time. There were also some additional suggestions for
transactions that should be added to the list comprising this exception, but they were not
included in the final act. Id. at 790-91.
231. These are basically today's "A," "B," "C," "E," and "F" reorganizations. I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (E), (F) (2000).
232. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C) (referring to properties transacted in the reorganization).
233. See also the discussion in the Senate. 61 CONG. REc. 6,561-66, 6,568 (1921),
reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 792-97. Interestingly, the same Act added
Subsection 202(c)(3), the predecessor of § 351, using the word "control" and mandating an
80% requirement rather than the more than 50% requirement. I.R.C. § 202(c)(3) (1921),
reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 790.
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changes and reduce litigation. These corporate changes were
described as required business "readjustments" 2 4-- events that were,
but should not be, considered realization events. The legislative
history further refers to the gains realized in such events as technical
gains,235 without actual cash profit,23 6 and repeated the language
referring to these transactions as paper transactions.23 7 Cashing out
from an investment became, therefore, one of the tests for a real (in
contrast to a technical) realization event. The discussion in the
Senate additionally provided the first seeds of doubt in this context.
The criticism of both the overbroad scope of the reorganization
provisions,23 and of transactions that consist of shifts of risks,23
demonstrate that the intention was to exempt from tax not only
technical transactions involving no actual changes in the structure of
the relevant corporate body, but also transactions that were
considered by the critics to be "more of a sale than an exchange." 240
Indeed, this leeway and the attendant fair-market-value basis241 in
such like-kind exchanges opened the door to an extensive tax
industry exploiting these provisions.242 This situation led to the Act
of March 4, 1923, which amended Subsection 202(c) to limit the
reach of nonrecognition to exchanges of stock and securities, but
234. See H.R. RE. No. 67-350, at 10 (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
790. Interestingly, the committee also assumed that the new rule would increase revenue since
it disallowed fictitious losses to taxpayers taking undesirable advantage of the nonrecognition
treatment of Section 202. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12 (1921), reprinted in
SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 791.
235. S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11-12 (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
791.
236. Id.
237. See the discussion in the Senate. 61 CONG. REC. 6,561-66 (1921), reprinted in
SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 792-96.
238. The reorganization provisions also included transactions where only a mere 50% or
more of control is retained in the "reorganized" corporation. I.R.C. § 202(c) (1921),
reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 789.
239. When one corporation owns property X and it is reorganized into another
corporation owning property Y, the remaining shareholders of both corporations now share
the risks in each of the two properties.
240. See the discussion in the Senate. 61 CONG. REc. 6,568 (1921), reprinted in
SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 796-97.
241. Since no exception to the basic cost-basis rule was enacted with respect to
reorganizations in 1921, see PAUL, supra note 211, at 23-24, the oversight allowed a free step-
up in basis and easy tax avoidance, thereby frustrating the basic tax-deferral policy goal of these
provisions.
242. HR. REP. No. 73, at 37-42 (Dec. 4, 1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note
222, at 332-38.
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which, as a result, retained such treatment for mergers,
consolidations, and reorganizations. 4 '
The 1924 Act was the next act addressing material changes in
the reorganization rules. It corrected the primary mistake of prior
law by providing for exchange-basis treatment of property exchanged
in a reorganization, rather than a fair-market-value basis," thus
substantiating the tax deferral, rather than concession, theory behind
such transactions. The act attempted to comprehensively rearrange
and clarify the corporate reorganization tax regime, serving as "the
nucleus of all later acts."24 In doing so, it developed the
reorganization provisions and brought us even closer to current law
by: (1) replacing the "readily realizable market value" equation with
the known "amount realized" concept;2 46  (2) providing, in
Subsection 203(a), that, subject to the exceptions, the entire amount
realized be recognized;247  (3) retaining the exception for
reorganizations, but adding requirements that the relevant taxpayers
must be "part[ies] to [the] reorganization" and that the transaction
must be "in pursuance of the plan of reorganization" ;2 48 and (4)
clarifying that nonrecognition also applies to corporations
exchanging property for stock or securities in another corporation
where both are parties to the reorganization of one.249  The
"reorganization" definition moved to Subsection 203(h) and added
the type "D" reorganization, involving one corporation's transfer of
assets to another corporation where such transferee corporation is
controlled by the transferor or its shareholders immediately after the
transaction.25 °
243. HR. Res. 13774, 67th Cong. § 1 (1923), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222,
at 797.
244. I.R-C. § 204(a) (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 698.
245. PAUL, supra note 211, at 24.
246. I.R.C. § 202(c) (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 686-87.
247. Id. § 203(a) (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 687.
248. Id. § 203(b)(2)-(3), (c)-(h) (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 689-
97. Interestingly, not until 1937 did the Supreme Court provide some guidance about what a
"party to the reorganization" means. The Court interpreted this requirement narrowly and
eliminated some "natural" reorganization candidates in the famous leading cases of Groman v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937), and Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938). The
Groman-Bashford doctrine was partially repealed by the 1954 Code, which provided guidance
based on a more liberal interpretation. Later amendments expanded this repeal: in the 1964
Act, to type "B" reorganizations; in the 1968 and 1970 Acts, to forward and reverse triangular
mergers, respectively; and, in the 1980 Act, to bankruptcy reorganizations.
249. I.R.C. § 203(b)(3) (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 690.
250. Id. § 203(h)(1)(B) (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 697.
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The congressional discussion evidenced very interesting and
harsh criticism of the rules corrected in 1924:
There is no more frequent or common course of evasion at the
present time than the provisions of the present law with reference
to reorganization of corporations. They are so extremely broad and
so loose that you could drive a four-horse team through them, and
any good corporation lawyer can provide a method of
reorganization by which, if a company has a large amount of cash
on hand, it could be distributed without any tax... and... evade
to a large measure not only the corporation tax, but in a great
many instances the personal income tax.
251
Nevertheless, the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 19322s2 basically
embedded these same rules in Sections 112 and 113.
In 1933, a special Ways and Means Subcommittee recommended
that the nonrecognition provisions relating to reorganizations be
abolished.23 The reasons for the recommendation were twofold:
closing "one of the most prevalent methods of tax avoidance," and
"simplify[ing] the income tax law." 2 4 Nevertheless, as usual in the
case of substantial tax reforms, timing was crucial. The Ways and
Means Committee rejected the report, basing its decision on the
economic realities of the time.255 The Committee concluded that the
abolition of the exchange and reorganization provisions might result
in a revenue loss, and that, in any case, most reorganizations showed
251. 65 CONG. REc. 2,429 (1924), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 697-98.
252. The 1932 Act did reduce the threshold for exchanged basis treatment in Subsection
113(a)(7) to 50%. I.R.C. § 113(a)(7) (1932), reprinted in SEIDMAN supra note 222, at 454.
Additionally, Subsection 112(k) was introduced to eliminate tax avoidance through transfers to
foreign corporations. Id. § 112(k) (1932), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 452.
253. H. REP. No. 73, at 8-9 (Dec. 4, 1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
332. The subcommittee added the acknowledgement that, in special cases, exchanges of stock,
for instance, may result in undue hardship on the taxpayers to pay the tax currently, since no
actual cash was received by them upon the exchange. In these special cases, the subcommittee
recommended that the Treasury be granted authority to extend the time for payment up to
two years. The background for this report had been the failure of the legislation to implement
the alleged policy in the area of corporate reorganizations. As Paul stated, "Elaborately drawn
provisions were found to be inadequate and ambiguous, and to the extent that they were clear,
they were exploited to the limit by diligent tax avoiders." PAUL, supra note 211, at 37. For
more critique, see supra Part II.B.
254. HR. REP. No. 73, at 8-9 (Dec. 4, 1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
332.
255. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 13-14 (1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
338-39.
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216a loss at the time. It concluded, therefore, that "the wiser policy is
to amend the provisions drastically to stop the known cases of tax
avoidance, rather than to eliminate the sections completely."2"7 The
committee referred to the courts as safeguards of the "right" policy.
This decision doomed the reorganization rules to live on as the
convoluted and complex regime we have today. Legislators have
consistently chosen to add patches of anti-avoidance rules rather than
re-evaluate the regime itself.
The Revenue Act of 193428 limited the definition of a
reorganization in Subsection 112(g) to what we know today as types
"A," "B," "C," "D," "E," and "F" reorganizations, allegedly
establishing a closer connection to corporate law by insisting on a
statutory merger and at least eighty percent control. 25 9 The Act also
added the "solely for all or part of its voting stock" requirement to
the type "B" and type "C" reorganizations.260 The substituted basis
rule was enforced in Subsection 113(a)(6).2 6 ' The type "G"
bankruptcy reorganization was added later and was subjected to the
"reorganization" definition by the Revenue Act of 1943, completing
the set of reorganizations presently in use.2 6 2
The 1930s brought an additional layer of rules to the taxation of
corporate reorganizations. Another wave of important cases
established judicial doctrines, requiring taxpayers to satisfy some
additional extra-statutory principles. The first doctrine was the
"business purpose" requirement. In the seminal case of Gregory v.
Helvering,263 the Supreme Court required, in addition to compliance
with the language of the statute, that a transaction must also serve a
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. The Revenue Act of 1938, and the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, without much
change to the Revenue Act of 1934, also limited this definition.
259. This change upgraded the previous requirement from a simple "majority" to one of
80%. I.R.C. § 112(g) (1934), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 341-42. The Revenue
Act of 1936 amended Subsection 112(h) in clarification of the "control" definition to at least
80% of the "total combined voting power," rather than just the "voting stock," supposedly not
changing the law by doing so. Id. § 112(h) (1936), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
243; 80 CONG. REc. 8,799 (1936), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 243.
260. I.RIC. § 112(g) (1934), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 341-42.
261. Id. § 113(a)(6) (1934), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 346.
262. Section 121(a) of the 1943 Act added Section 112(b)(10) to the Code. Id. §
112(b)(10) (1943), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS: 1953-1939, at 1551-52 (1953). In this
Article, I do not generally refer to this type "G" reorganization, for simplicity.
263. 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
"business or corporate purpose" in order to claim "reorganization"
treatment. This requirement has long been embodied in the
applicable regulations" and has since been consistently followed by
the courts and the Internal Revenue Service.
The second judicial doctrine, the "continuity of business
enterprise" (COBE),26 s  requires that enough of the target
corporation's business must be carried on by the acquiring
corporation. This doctrine has also been incorporated into the
regulations and has been followed, although somewhat
inconsistently.26 6 The COBE requirement emphasizes the policy that
the reorganization of a business should not trigger recognition and
current taxation of income because of a mere formal change in the
corporate structure, so long as the business itself (and its value)
remains essentially unchanged.
The third, and probably most influential doctrine, is the
"continuity of shareholder (proprietary) interest" (COSI). It
complements COBE, from the perspective of the shareholders'
proprietary interests, in supporting the same policy that recognition
of income and its current taxation should not be triggered due to
mere formal changes in the corporate structure of an investment. In
particular, this should not be the case where the same investors hold
the same investment, with no changes to the nature of that
investment. The purpose of this requirement has been to distinguish
"sales," disguised in the statutory language of the reorganization
provisions, from bona fide transactions, serving merely as
readjustments to the corporate form of the investment.267
264. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)-(c) (as amended in 2001).
265. This doctrine has been applied unevenly throughout the years-it was abandoned
for some time, and then it reemerged recently in the form of a final regulation. See John T.
Sapienza, Tax Considerations in Corporate Reorganizations and Mergers, 60 Nw. U. L. REV.
765, 782 (1965-1966).
266. Compare Rev. Rul. 56-330, 1956-2 C.B. 204, at 205-06 (asserting that the purpose
of the reorganization provisions is to exempt from the general recognition rule certain specified
exchanges incidental to readjustments of corporate structures, and only readjustments of
continuing interests in property under modified corporate forms, and declaring that this was an
established policy of the IRS), with Rev. Rul. 63-29, 1963-1 C.B. 77 (directly revoking Rev.
Rul. 56-330). Currently, the doctrine is reinforced in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (as amended
2001).
267. Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S.
378 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cortland
Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cit. 1932). The requirement was incorporated in
the regulations, first in Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.112(g) (1940). See PAUL, supra note 211, at 92
n.303. Presently it is in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended 2001).
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In addition to these three requirements, the courts have applied
several other judicial techniques in the interpretation of the
corporate reorganization provisions. The most quoted is the "Step-
Transaction" doctrine, 68 an extension of the substance-over-form
idea, which is the actual conceptual basis for the reorganization rules
themselves-nonrecognition allowed to formal changes that do not
amount to substantive changes justifying recognition and current
taxation of income.
The 1939 Act (and Internal Revenue Code) added the rule that,
in general, assumption of liabilities, or receipt of an asset subject to a
liability in a reorganization, should not be considered as an income-
recognition event.2 69 The rationale of this amendment follows that of
the general nonrecognition rules for reorganizations, which is that
no "real" realization has occurred, that taxation will cause undue
hardship on taxpayers since they received no cash in the transaction,
and, oddly, that it is the taxpayers' expectations that there will be no
recognition involved in these transactions.27 ° Interestingly, the
legislative history indicates that the House was concerned about
restructuring the reorganization provisions based on "uniform
equitable rules," emphasizing the primacy of the concept that no
recognition is required in corporate noncash-out transactions.27'
Fairness, rather than efficiency or administrative ease, seemed to be
the rhetorical engine behind the 1939 legislature.272
The 1951 Act formally reintroduced spin-off transactions to the
list of potential candidates for nonrecognition.273 The legislators
268. Bassick v. Comm'r, 85 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1936); Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm'r,
11 T.C. 397 (1948), affdpercuriam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949).
269. I.R.C. § 213(a), (c) (1939), amending § 112(b)(5), (k) (1938), reprinted in
SEIDMAN, supra note 262, at 1539, 1593. The change was made in view of United States v.
Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938), which was interpreted to the effect of current recognition of
gain in a reorganization to the extent of the assumption of liabilities involved; the Ways and
Means Committee assumed that Hendler nullified the reorganization provisions. H.R REP.
No. 76-855, at 4-5 (1939), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 262, at 1593.
270. H.R REP No. 76-855, at 19-20 (1939), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 262, at
1539-40.
271. Id.
272. The trigger for the legislation was, of course, the Hendler case. See supra note 269.
273. Originally permitted to be accomplished tax-free by the Revenue Act of 1924, they
were repealed by the Revenue Act of 1934. Section 317(a) of the 1951 Act introduced I.R.C.
§ 112(6)(11). S. REP. No. 82-781, at 57-58 (1951), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 262,
at 1556. Congress feared that Mrs. Gregory might win her case, as she did at the Board of Tax
Appeals (now the U.S. Tax Court). Evelyn F. Gregory, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932). See
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 8, 13.02-03.
thought that impeding such transactions (by not allowing them
nonrecognition treatment) would be economically unsound,
deviating from the traditional fairness-based language to a more
efficiency-based rationalization.2 74 The Internal Revenue Code of
1954 basically rearranged the statutory scheme to the format we face
today, presenting in Subsection 368(a) a conclusive definition of six
types of transactions that qualify as reorganizations, namely types
"A," "B," "4C," "D,." "E," and "F" reorganizations. Subsections
354(a) and 361(a) provided the operative rules of nonrecognition to
the shareholders and corporations, respectively, party to the
reorganization.275 The code also relaxed the requirements of the type
"C" reorganization, allowing for twenty percent "boot" leeway,
similar to current law.276 Importantly, this code enacted the elaborate
provisions and limitations for tax attribute carryover.277
Interestingly, the Ways and Means Committee had proposed to
distinguish between publicly traded and closely held corporations,
arguing that the former, having more separate existence than the
latter, do not tend to engage in reorganizations merely to secure tax
advantages for their shareholders.278 This proposal, even though it
came from an anti-avoidance background, attempted to create,
through a semiformal test, a more substantive rule. The Senate,
however, rejected the proposal.279
The 1954 code also added Subsection 368(a)(2)(C), allowing
use of parent stock in type "C" reorganizations and permitting a
drop down (contribution) of assets acquired in a type "C"
reorganization to a controlled subsidiary immediately after the
original exchange (the receipt of these assets for stock of the
exchanging (parent) corporation) without gain recognition. This was
the first "triangular reorganization" provision, and similar additions
274. S. REP. No. 82-781, at 57-58 (1951), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 262, at
1556. The spin-off provisions are technically beyond the scope of this Article, but I chose to
include them here because they were part of the same body of legislation as the reorganization
provisions, they were conditioned on a "good" reorganization, and they indicate the mindset
and rationale of the legislature.
275. Including the basic repeal of the Groman-Bashford narrow interpretation of "a party
to the reorganization," to allow for an acquiring corporation to transfer stock of its parent in
the reorganization. See H.R REP. No. 83-1227, at 40 (1954); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 52
(1954).
276. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 52 (1954).
277. The then, and current I.R.C. § 381, 382 (2000).
278. HR. REP. No. 83-1227, at 39 (1954).
279. S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 51 (1954).
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were subsequently added to the tax code: the extension of the
Subsection 368(a)(2)(C) treatment to type "B" reorganizations in
1964; the addition of Subsection 368(a)(2)(D), addressing forward
triangular mergers, in 1968; and the addition of Subsection
368(a)(2)(E), addressing the reverse triangular merger, in 1971.
These additions intentionally expanded the scope of nonrecognition
to transactions economically similar to other reorganizations,
providing corporate groups with further flexibility and easier paths to
circumvent the original limitations on the nonrecognition tax
benefit.28 °
In the 1970s, legislators further developed anti-abuse rules aimed
at denying deductions for artificial losses realized by investment
companies,"' again stressing their intention to allow tax benefits
relating to reorganizations only in certain situations, and only when
active business is involved. In 1980, the type "G" bankruptcy
reorganization was enacted.8 2 This decade also saw other slight
modifications to the scope of certain reorganizations and their
application to special entities.283 In the 1990s, most of the legislative
activity surrounded divisive reorganizations, which are beyond my
scope here. Throughout this period no explicit discussion of the
policy behind the reorganization provisions is evident.
The important Tax Reform Act of 1986 did add a significant
new piece to the puzzle, although indirectly, with the abolishment of
the "General Utilities" doctrine. This doctrine had allowed
taxpayers, in certain cases, to make the tax deferral in M&A
transactions permanent, avoiding at least one level of corporate tax.
The 1986 Act generally confined the application of tax-free
reorganizations to pure tax-deferral transactions, barring an easy path
280. These rules allow, for example, a foreign corporation to acquire, tax free, a domestic
corporation, by organizing a domestic subsidiary that actually affects the acquisition/merger.
The consideration to the target shareholder remains the stock of the parent, i.e., the foreign
company.
281. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520; Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
282. Bankruptcy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389, clarified in Technical
Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365. This reorganization type is, of
course, beyond my scope.
283. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102
Stat. 3342; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
to tax avoidance and preserving the integrity of the carried-over asset
basis as the price for such deferral.
It is evident that the reorganization provisions and their benefits
are intended to apply only to transactions where either the core
ownership group or the core business, or both, remain substantially
the same except for a formal change justified by business reasons.
This is also the basic rationale behind their legislation, as apparent
from the famous Bazley quote.2"4 This justification, originally
supported by perceptions of fairness, is the cornerstone for allowing
reorganizations to maintain their role as necessary exceptions to the
fundamental (though vague and sometimes unsatisfactory)
realization basis of the income tax system. In the background, one
can perceive that reorganizations are also justified by efficiency
reasons, since they allow businesses flexibility without prohibitive tax
costs to mere technical changes. This scheme has not been effectively
challenged over the years. In the next section, I elaborate on some of
the more serious critique attempts.
II. MAJOR HISTORICAL CRITIQUES OF THE
REORGANIZATION PROVISIONS
The complexity of the American tax system, the tax code, and
the reorganization provisions in particular is notorious. Many
proposals for changes to these provisions have been presented,
primarily with the goal of shutting down various planning
techniques.285 However, only a handful of analytical work has been
done to evaluate the essence of the rules with the goal of
fundamental changes, or complete repeal, despite these provisions'
apparent lack of theoretical support. As observed by Professor Paul in
1940, "The statute imposed objective tests in defining
reorganizations; these tests furnished Euclidian formulae as to what
should be done, but said nothing about why." 8 6 The sole serious
proposal to repeal the reorganization provisions occurred in 1933.
As mentioned previously, a special Ways and Means Subcommittee
recommended abolition of the provisions, purely on simplicity and
anti-avoidance grounds.2"7 The subcommittee acknowledged that the
284. See supra text accompanying note 8.
285. See, e.g., BIIrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 8, 12.01[5].
286. PAUL, supra note 211, at 121.
287. H.R REP. No. 73, at 8-9 (Dec. 4, 1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at
332. The subcommittee added the acknowledgement that, in special cases, exchanges of stock,
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effect of these provisions was merely deferral of the payment of the
tax and mentioned three reasons for the existence of the (then)
current regime: (1) the exchange and reorganization provisions
prevent much of the uncertainty and litigation under prior law
(regarding the question of whether a realization event occurred or
not); (2) the discussed transactions are merely normal business
adjustments and the profits from them are merely paper profits that
should be exempt in order to not interfere with the normal course of
business; and (3) it prevents taxpayers from taking colorable losses.
Nevertheless, the subcommittee concluded that the experience of the
administration was that the abuse and avoidance opportunities far
outweigh the advantages above.288 In response to the first reason
mentioned above, the report relies on the fact that the law was
complex, uncertain, and even harder to administrate than prior law.
The report accepted the second argument as having some merit, but
repeated its determination that the abuse outweighs the advantages.
Structurally, the subcommittee commented that the "system is
unsound which does not tax gains in the year in which realized,"
289
concluding with the estimation that these provisions result in a
considerable loss of revenue.2 9° The committee itself rejected the
report, concluding that the repeal might result in a revenue loss and
preferring an opportunistic hole-plugging policy.
In the next seventy years, only a handful of articles attempted to
fundamentally criticize the reorganizations regime. In 1938, Milton
Sandberg explicitly stated that the tax treatment of reorganizations
amounts to a subsidy of such transactions, adding that "the most
striking thing of all is that no one can satisfactorily explain why they
were ever enacted or why they have remained."'2 9 He realized that
there is no stated explanation for subsidizing these transactions and
not other transactions, and that there is not even an unstated reason
for instance, may result in undue hardship on the taxpayers to pay the tax currently, since no
actual cash was received by them upon the exchange. In these special cases the subcommittee
recommended that the Treasury be granted authority to extend the time for payment up to
two years. The background for this report had been the failure of the legislation to implement
the alleged policy in the area of corporate reorganizations.
288. H.R. REP. No. 73, at 37-42 (Dec. 4, 1933), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note
222, at 334.
289. Id. at 8-9, reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 332.
290. Id. at 37-42, reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 222, at 335.
291. Sandberg, supra note 11, at 98.
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that could plausibly support this subsidy.29 2 The most quoted article
in this line was written by Jerome R. Hellerstein after the enactment
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, proposing to eliminate the
reorganization provisions from the code.293 Hellerstein identified the
original reasons for reorganizations: the merely-formal-changes
reason, the hardship-to-taxpayers reason, and the administrative and
taxpayers' convenience reason. He also identified the implied
efficiency justification-that reorganizations are necessary in order to
not discourage ordinary adjustments and to allow healthy expansion
of the economy.' 9' He then argued that none of these reasons could
hold fast, and that "Congress has not seriously considered the
wisdom of granting nonrecognition to reorganization exchanges 295
in light of the 1933 report and all the preparatory work done prior
to the enactment of the "new" 1954 code. The best proof is in the
first and primary justification for reorganization preferences, since
they actually applied (and continue to apply today) not only to clear
changes in form, but also to a variety of transactions where
"substantial changes in position take place." '296 Nonrecognition
treatment is normally (as it should be) a rare exception in the tax
law, and narrowly circumscribed. Amazingly, that has not been the
case where reorganizations are involved, where nonrecognition was
and is granted in a most sweeping manner, affecting a large number
of transactions and substantial amounts of gains and losses.297 The
result of this extraordinary treatment of reorganizations is
"favoritism and discrimination" (basically an equitable problem), and
it lengthens the interval between wealth increases and taxation, i.e.,
it extends the deviation of realization-based income tax from the
Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income.29 Hellerstein also rejects
the hardship and convenience reasons, since these are just difficulties
that could be easily solved. Regarding the implied efficiency
justification to reorganizations, he shows that no evidence has been
292. Id. at 101-02.
293. Hellerstein, supra note 9, at 254. Interestingly, the House Bill of 1954
unsuccessfully attempted to limit the scope of transactions qualifying for the preferential
nonrecognition treatment. See H.tL 8300, 83d Cong., § 359(b)-(d) (1954); Crockett, supra
note 50, at 9-10.
294. Hellerstein, supra note 9, at 276.
295. Id. at 259 n.22.
296. Id. at 262.
297. Id. at 265-66.
298. Id. at 271.
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presented in its support."' Furthermore, he relies on economic
studies of the mergers of the first half of the century to show an
increase in tax-motivated mergers, using stock compensation instead
of cash. Nevertheless, taxable cash transactions were still significant,
and tax motives were generally affecting the form of the transaction
rather than the decision of whether to merge. He concluded that
there is no evidence that reorganizations are actually efficiency-
increasing, nor is there evidence to support the notion that their
elimination would "impose a significant barrier to the expansion or
health of our economy."3 ° Congress ignored all of these arguments
and kept (in the 1954 code) things as they were, following the
uneducated path of its 1934 predecessor. I chose to discuss
Hellerstein's arguments at length, since, unfortunately, they are as
relevant today as they were 45 years ago.
In 1976, Professor Crockett reviewed once again the original
and other justifications for the tax subsidy to reorganizations,
concluding that reorganizations are "no longer necessarily beneficial
to the economy,"301 referring back to Sandberg and Hellerstein, °2
and further determining that reorganizations do not serve the "goals
of an equitable tax structure." 313 In 1985, Professor Posin made yet
another contribution, focusing on the notorious complexity of the
reorganization provisions, conservatively suggesting caution, in spite
of the shortcomings of a "known" system.30 4 Unfortunately, he
supported his suggestion only with the observation that such an
overhaul may result in making the system worse, without actual
analysis or specific improvement proposals.0 ' In 1989, Professor
Coven reached the conclusion that "the need to quite generally
overhaul the taxation of corporate acquisitions is entirely evident."3 6
He ably argued that such overhaul must include a comprehensive
solution to all corporate acquisitions, specifically promoting a
mandatory carryover basis system for all such transactions.0 7
299. Id. at 277.
300. Id. at 279.
301. Crockett, supra note 50, at 26.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 29.
304. Posin, supra note 203, at 1407-08.
305. Id.
306. Coven, supra note 10, at 203.
307. Id.
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One would expect that this visible criticism," 8 despite its relative
thinness throughout the years, would be more influential, or, at
least, ignite a lively debate. This is a major part of the tax law, and it
is criticized as intellectually unfounded. However, that has not been
the case, and the critique remains basically unanswered." 9
308. Most of the literature appeared in leading legal publications. See supra notes 291-
300, 305-06.
309. I found one interesting response to Hellerstein. John Dane Jr., of the Department
of Corporations and Taxation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, argued against
Hellerstein's criticism of the reorganization provisions that it is not fair to tax a taxpayer on a
gain from a nonvoluntary transaction. John Dane Jr., The Case for Nonrecognition of Gain in
Reorganization Exchanges, TAXES, Apr. 1958, at 244. Mr. Dane's experience in Massachusetts,
where the law taxed reorganizations, supported, in his opinion, the Federal treatment. He
admitted that such unfairness can be remedied, but seemed to ignore this in his conclusion,
failing to support it with other explanations or empirical evidence from his experience. This
criticism is interesting, since it may inspire further study of parallel systems that do tax
reorganizations. I found no such existing study.
